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REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: RECONCEIVING THE FEDERAL
PROSECUTOR’S ROLE THROUGH A
HISTORICAL LENS
SCOTT INGRAM*
ABSTRACT
For nearly 100 years courts and legal scholars have held prosecutors to the
“justice” standard, meaning that the prosecutor’s first duty is to ensure
that justice is done.  With this command, prosecutors have increased their
discretion.  The modern prosecutor’s power is unrivaled in the criminal
justice system.  Judges and defense attorneys have ceded some of their power
to prosecutors.  The prosecutor’s power has led a host of commentators to
critique prosecutorial use of power for a variety of reasons.  Rather than
add to this voluminous literature by defending or critiquing prosecutorial
power, this Article challenges the underlying assumption of prosecutorial
power: that prosecutors pursue justice.  It argues that prosecutors should be
freed from the “justice” standard and, instead, at least on the federal level,
be responsive only to clearly articulated executive policy.
To demonstrate how prosecutors would function in a system where
they are not required to do justice, this article examines criminal enforce-
ment of the federal government’s neutrality policy in 1793.  This was the
new government’s first organized foray into criminal prosecution.  Presi-
dent George Washington and his administration proceeded based on
national interest and expected their attorneys, the United States District
Attorneys, to adhere and enforce the national policy.  The Article begins by
establishing that federal prosecutors represent the government and not the
people’s interests.  It then defines how the people are represented in a repub-
lican government with a particular focus on how members of Washington’s
administration interpreted the concept of representation.  It then describes
how Washington and his administration enforced neutrality through crim-
inal prosecution.  Against this backdrop, the final section argues that our
modern federal prosecutorial problems can be resolved if we reconceive the
federal prosecutor’s function as a policy enforcer rather than a quasi-judi-
cial figure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys represent clients and advocate their clients’ legal posi-
tions.  Prosecuting attorneys, like other attorneys, have clients.  Prosecu-
tors, depending on whether they are state or federal prosecutors,
represent their state or the United States.  Or the government.  Or the
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, High Point University.
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people.  Perhaps they represent the victim or the police.  Maybe they
represent justice.  Herein lies the prosecutor’s dilemma.  Whom does
the prosecutor represent?
This is not simply an academic question.  Prosecutors, unlike other
attorneys, do not have living clients who provide instructions.1  They do
not have to report to a client about the case’s progress.  They do not
have to concern themselves with the possibility that the client may
choose another attorney if the attorney does not meet the client’s
expectations.  They do not have to bill their time.  Instead, prosecutors
enjoy tremendous discretion.  They decide whom to charge.  They
decide what to charge.  They decide to dismiss a case.  They decide to
settle cases without consulting anyone.
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have endeavored to under-
stand and explain why prosecutors have so much power and how prose-
cutors exercise it.2  Some have proposed ideas to restrain this power.3
This Article addresses the problem of prosecutorial discretion generally
and client identification specifically by explaining what it means to
represent the United States government.  As the government’s attorney,
the prosecutor must represent and advocate the government’s interests.
However, the government’s interests in a criminal case are not clear.
The United States government originates from the people.  The people
primarily speak through elections.  They also express their voice
through actions of popular sovereignty including social media, public
1. One might argue that some corporate attorneys do not have living clients.  How-
ever, corporate attorneys will still meet with corporate CEOs or others who have responsi-
bility for the corporation.  States and the United States do not have comparable people.
The closest that come are the Governor or President.  Neither of these officials meet with
prosecutors regularly and certainly do not call upon them for advice, in the case of Gover-
nors and local prosecutors.
2. Most recently legal scholars have led the inquiry into prosecutorial discretion
while using social science methods. See e.g., Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1125 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & Marc L. Miller, The Many
Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. OF CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27 (2014).  Others who have studied
prosecutorial discretion include criminologists, psychologists, sociologists, political scien-
tists, economists, and historians. See e.g., Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution
Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y R. 461 (2005); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense
Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987); Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private
and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBLEMS 4
(1979); Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States
Attorneys’ Offices, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2002); Edward L. Glaeser, Daniel P. Kessler & Anne
Morrison Piehl, What Do Prosecutors Maximize?: An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug
Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259 (2000); Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of
Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 THE AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995)
3. See e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U L. REV. 911 (2006); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007); Richard Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987);
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 959 (2009).
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opinion polls, and organized or spontaneous protests.  In criminal jus-
tice matters, the people speak through jury service.  Yet the government
does not always respond as some people desire.  Sometimes the govern-
ment takes a position diametrically opposed to the majority’s desires.
Therefore, if the prosecutor represents the United States government,
and the government originates with the people, how can the prosecutor
choose between these opposing positions?
The accepted answer is that prosecutors must seek justice above all
else.  However, this vague standard provides little guidance for day-to-
day decisions.4  Instead, this Article asserts that prosecutors should
eschew the justice standard and, instead, adhere to clearly enunciated
presidential policy.
The starting point for this assertion is the attorney-client relation-
ship.  The unique nature of the prosecutor’s attorney-client relation-
ship distinguishes prosecutors from all other attorneys.5  By identifying
4. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About A
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637–38 (2006); Fred
C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 256 (1993); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of
the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. OF CRIM. L. 197, 227 (1988).
5. ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.8 defines the special responsi-
bilities.  The prosecutor is the only attorney that has “special responsibilities.”  Rule 3.8
states: The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; (b) make reasonable efforts to
assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining,
counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; (c) not seek to
obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the
right to a preliminary hearing; (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to
the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evi-
dence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: (1) the
information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; (2) the
evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or
prosecution; and (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; (f)
except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of
the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from
making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the pros-
ecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule. (g) When a prosecutor
knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted,
the prosecutor shall: (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or
authority, and (2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, (i)
promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and (ii)
undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to
determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
commit. (h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that
a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defen-
dant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction. Rule 3.8: Spe-
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not only the prosecutor’s client but also identifying that client’s inter-
ests, we can provide workable boundaries for prosecutorial discretion.
At first reading, disconnecting prosecutors and justice may sound
absurd.  It seems out of place in today’s prosecutorial culture.  The
“pursuit of justice” is a bedrock principle for prosecutors.6  However,
examining the origins of federal criminal prosecution reveals the bene-
fits gained by disconnecting prosecutors from the requirement that
they “seek justice.”  Among these benefits is the possibility that we can
return to a better balance of power between prosecutors, judges,
defense attorneys, and, especially, juries.
One important distinction must be made prior to proceeding.  The
United States federal government system creates two (and arguably
three) prosecutor categories.  Federal prosecutors (i.e. United States
attorneys and Justice Department lawyers) represent the United States
as a whole and prosecute violations of federal criminal law.7  State pros-
ecutors represent their specific state and prosecute violations of state
criminal law.8  The third group represents a local government such as a
city or town and prosecutes violations of local ordinances.9  Of these
three groups, state prosecutors handle the majority of criminal cases.10
This Article addresses only federal prosecutors for two reasons.  First,
federal prosecutors have more discretion when making charging deci-
sions than either of the other two groups because the federal criminal
code employs very broad statutory language.11  A wide variety of con-
duct falls within a wide variety of statutes.  State and local prosecutors,
conversely, have simpler and narrower criminal statutes.  State and local
cial Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 38 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1983).
6. Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted
from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 39–47 (2009) (discussing the “minister
of justice” model for prosecutors).
7. About DOJ, DEP’T OF JUST. (2015), http://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Sept.
18, 2015).
8. This is a generalized statement.  Different states style their criminal cases differ-
ently.  For example, New York labels its cases as “The People.” See e.g., The People v.
Howard S. Wright, 37 N.E.3d 1127 (N.Y. 2015).  Pennsylvania styles its cases as “Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania.” See e.g., Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2015).
Maryland styles its cases as “State of Maryland.” See e.g., State v. Sutro Waine, 122 A.3d 294
(Md. 2015).
9. For example, in St. Louis, Missouri, the City Counselor’s office handles all traffic
and ordinance violations, among other legal matters, for the City. CITY COUNSELOR’S
OFFICE, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/counselor/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2015).
10. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, there were slightly more than 80,000
criminal defendants sentenced in federal court during Fiscal Year 2013. GLENN R.
SCHMITT & ELIZABETH JONES, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2014).  By comparison, in all five boroughs of New York
City, the courts disposed of over 315,000 cases in 2015. Caseload Statistics 2015, N.Y.
COURTS. GOV. (2015), http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/caseloadstatis-
tics.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2016).
11. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforce-
ment Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 761 (1999) (asserting that Congress has “eschewed
legislative specificity” to an “extraordinary extent” in criminal statutes).
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prosecutors also have more scrutiny placed on their decisions.12  As
(usually) elected officials,13 they will have significant public relations
problems if they decide not to prosecute armed robberies.  Federal
prosecutors will not have the same outcry if they refuse to prosecute
people selling ginseng dug out of season.14  Second, federal prosecu-
tors, in terms of historical study, have a formal starting point.  The First
Congress created them in the 1789 Judiciary Act.15  Observing this start-
ing point gives a clear view of how the first federal prosecutors per-
formed their role.16  The precedent setting activity can be identified.
Conversely, the origins of state prosecutors are murky, dating to colo-
nial times.17  Different colonies had different legal systems and a single
starting point for state and local prosecutors cannot be found.18
Examining the federal prosecutor’s origins also adds depth to our
modern understanding of the position in a variety of ways.19  Today’s
federal prosecutors do not work in a historical vacuum.  If this is
doubted, one can examine the Southern District of New York United
States Attorney’s Office.  New prosecutors are indoctrinated into the
office’s history and unique reputation.20  The early work of federal
prosecutors also provides a clear view of their role perception and
duties.  There is less work and few bureaucratic layers.  As a result, we
see direct interaction between the people, the government, and their
attorneys.  A historical perspective also provides insight into the role’s
12. Stuart A. Scheingold & Lynne A. Gressett, Policy, Politics and the Criminal Courts,
12 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 461, 477–78 (1987).
13. At least Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware do not elect their local prosecu-
tors. See Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CONN.: DIVISION OF CRIM. JUST. (2016), http://
www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?q=285526 (last visited Nov. 4, 2016); N.J. CONST. art. VII,
§ 2; About the Office, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2016), http://attorneygeneral.
delaware.gov/executive/about.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2016).
15. 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (establishing the United States District Attorney and the Attor-
ney General).
16. I recognize that any picture developed through historical inquiry is inevitably
incomplete.  As my research has shown, the surviving records are certainly incomplete.
Also, especially in cases such as the one discussed in this Article, there was much more
than written communication.  However, the conversations, with the exception of Jeffer-
son’s notes about them, do not survive the moment.
17. JOAN JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 6 (1980).
18. Id. at 12–15; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17–19 (3d
ed. 2005).
19. Much of the historical research about federal prosecutors is tangential to a
larger point.  For example following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the
independent counsel case of Morrison v. Olson, several scholars wrote about the begin-
nings of federal criminal prosecution when attempting to answer whether law enforce-
ment was a “core executive function” of the president. See e.g., Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is
Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L. J.
1069 (1990); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 AM. U. L. R. 275 (1989); Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney
General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L. J.
561 (1989).
20. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 607,
610–12 (1998) (discussing in the introduction his entry into the Southern District of New
York’s U.S. Attorney’s Office).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE202.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-SEP-17 12:26
298 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
origins.  Discussing prosecutors as they function today drops us into the
middle of the story.  We have no context or sense of how the characters
arrived in their roles.  Examining their history, and specifically their
origins as this Article does, provides the necessary context and gives
lessons for today.21
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part one identifies the United
States government as the federal prosecutor’s client from among poten-
tial client identities based upon the text of the 1789 Judiciary Act.  The
second part explores what it means to represent the United States gov-
ernment by examining what representation meant to those who served
in the federal government following the Constitution’s ratification.
Representation defines the relationship between the people and the
government and answers questions relating to how people express their
opinions to the government and how the government speaks to the
people.  If prosecutors represent the United States government, we
need to understand what representation means when talking about a
republican form of government.  With this understanding, we see how
“the people,” the federal government, and the government’s attorneys
are not closely connected and that federal prosecutors are insulated
from public demands.  Section three moves from the theoretical to the
practical by looking at how the people and the government communi-
cated in a specific situation: the 1793 neutrality crisis and the resulting
criminal prosecution of Gideon Henfield.  Throughout the case, the
people and the government communicated through symbolic actions.
More importantly, we see how the United States District Attorney repre-
sents the government, not the people.  The final section takes the les-
sons learned from the case and applies them to prosecutors today.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that prosecutors fulfill their represen-
tative function by zealously advocating the United States government’s
policy positions, not by “seeking justice.”
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROSECUTOR’S CLIENT
There are many possible answers to whom the prosecutor repre-
sents.22  These include the public, victims, law enforcement agencies,
United States Attorneys, the Attorney General, the President, and the
United States government.23  Identifying the prosecutor’s client makes
a practical difference when evaluating prosecutorial decision-making.
A prosecutor who perceives the victim as a client might be less likely to
dismiss a case than a prosecutor who perceives a law enforcement
agency as a client.  The victim might demand retribution through the
21. One thing not intended by this perspective is to argue for an originalist per-
spective.  This Article does not argue that because the government began this way that we
must return to it.  Today’s federal government is much different than it was in the 1790s
and we cannot go back to it.  However, there are approaches and perspectives from this
time that give us insight into how federal prosecutors should use their discretion today.
22. James R. Harvey, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representa-
tion of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1996).
23. Id.
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courts, but law enforcement will see the matter as just another case.24  A
federal prosecutor who perceives a United States attorney as a client
may be less likely to follow Department of Justice policies than one who
sees the Attorney General as the client.25  The assistant United States
attorney who perceives the United States attorney as a client will follow
local concerns more than the national concerns the Attorney General
represents.
The federal prosecutor’s origins demonstrate that they represent
the United States government.  Prior to independence, each colony
operated its own unique judicial system despite all deriving from the
British common law system.26  While not all were similarly effective,
they shared certain characteristics.27  Generally, justice was adminis-
tered by private parties.28  Crime victims presented their own cases to
justices of the peace or grand juries.29  If the case progressed further,
the victim would have had to hire an attorney to present the case.  Not
everyone could afford an attorney.  In some places, this meant the attor-
ney that handled the court’s clerical duties would present the case.30
This attorney, who was often freshly admitted to the bar, would also
present the evidence in cases where the grand jury acted on its own
information.31  In this capacity, the public prosecutor served more as a
judicial figure than an executive one.32
Following independence, the colonial systems continued as state
court systems.  While debating the Constitution, however, questions
arose about the need for and power of federal courts.33  During the
years preceding the revolution, the British used courts to control the
24. See generally Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecu-
tors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
25. H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 129, 135 (1998).
26. Douglas Greenberg, The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in Eighteenth-Century New
York, in 1 CRIME & JUST. IN AM. HIST. 264 (Erik H. Monkkonen ed., 1991) [hereinafter
Law-Enforcement in Eighteenth-Century New York]; Douglas Greenberg, Crime, Law Enforcement
and Social Control in Colonial America, in 1 CRIME & JUST. IN AM. HIST. 231, 262 (Erik H.
Monkkonen ed., 1991); David H. Flaherty, Crime and Social Control in Provincial Massachu-
setts, 1 CRIME & JUST. IN AM. HIST. 105, 117 (Erik H. Monkkonen ed., 1991).  There were
also Dutch and French influences on the American system. See JACOBY, supra note 17, at 3.
27. Compare Flaherty, supra note 26, with Law Enforcement in Eighteenth Century New
York, supra note 26.
28. See JACOBY, supra note 17, at 18–19; John A.J. Ward, Private Prosecution: The
Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV. 1171 (1972); Andrew Sidman, The Outmoded Concept of
Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754 (1975).  These articles argue against the use of
private prosecution.  For the nineteenth century history, see Allen Steinberg, From Private
Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney and American Legal
History, 30 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 568 (1984); Ireland, supra note 2.
29. Steinberg, supra note 28, at 571.
30. JACOBY, supra note 17, at 14–17.
31. See Ireland, supra note 2, at 43–44.
32. JACOBY, supra note 17, at 19–20.
33. WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 5 (Wythe
Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990); WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (Herbert A. John-
son ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC]; Maeva Marcus
& Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpreta-
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colonists and force compliance with perceived unjust laws.34  When the
British prosecuted colonists for resisting these laws, colonial juries often
refused to indict or convict.35  This experience caused many to fear
strong judicial control and prefer juries in all criminal cases.36  Unable
to reconcile competing views, the Constitutional Convention settled on
a federal Supreme Court, with limited jurisdiction, and left the creation
of inferior federal courts to the First Congress.37
The First Congress inherited the federal court problem and made
establishing lower federal courts one of its first priorities.38  Through-
out the summer of 1789, Congress crafted the Judiciary Act.  In addi-
tion to establishing a system of inferior federal courts, Congress created
two new attorney positions.  The first was United States District Attor-
neys.39  Each federal court district—which the legislation created to
correspond with the boundaries of each state—had its own attorney.
The attorney had to be learned in the law and was to represent the
United States in every civil or criminal case in which it had an interest
arising in the federal courts for that district.40  The second was the
Attorney General.41  Also to be learned in the law, the Attorney General
was to represent the United States in the Supreme Court and give legal
opinions to the executive departments.42  Initially, the Senate gave the
Supreme Court power to appoint the Attorney General.43  Later in the
legislative process, Congress made the Attorney General an executive
tion, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 13
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
34. Jon P. McClanahan, The ‘True’ Right to Trial by Jury: The Founders’ Formulation and
its Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 799 (2008).
35. Id.
36. RITZ, supra note 33, at 5; THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note
33, at 32; Marcus & Wexler, supra note 33.
37. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2–3; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 108 (1950) (stating that all agreed a Supreme Court was
necessary to protect federal interests and asserting that many opposed giving Congress
the power to create inferior federal courts).
38. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of
Government, 1789–1791, 2 U. OF CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 208 (1995).
39. Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, § 35.
40. Id. (“And there shall be appointed in each district a meet person learned in the
law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed
to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district
all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United
States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned, except before
the supreme court in the district in which that court shall be holden.”).
41. Id. (“And there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act
as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to faithful execu-
tion of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme
Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion
on questions of law when requested by the President of the United States, or when
requested of any of the heads of the departments, touching any matters that may concern
their departments, and shall receive such compensation for his services as shall by law be
provided.”).
42. Id.
43. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 108–09 (1923).  There is also evidence that an initial draft made the
United States District Attorneys appointed by a federal district judge. Id. at 109 (quoting a
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appointment with the Senate’s advice and consent.44  This structure
mirrored the state prosecutorial structure to an extent.  By this time, all
states had attorneys general, and many used public prosecutors.45
However, these positions were perceived as judicial offices, not as attor-
neys representing the government.46  The Judiciary Act, with its express
statement about representation, moved the federal attorneys into the
executive branch.
Within days of the Judiciary Act becoming law, President George
Washington appointed the Attorney General and many of the United
States District Attorneys.47  The Senate quickly approved them.48
Other than the qualifications and broadly described duties, the
Judiciary Act provided little guidance to these new federal attorneys.
Per its language, the Judiciary Act made the office holder the “attorney
for the United States in such district.”49  This language makes clear that
the attorney represents the United States.  However, is it the United
States or the United States government?  Are they two different things?
Do they have different interests?
Ideally, the United States and its government have the same inter-
ests.  What this means precisely is the subject of the next Section.  Rep-
resenting the United States, however, excludes others from being the
federal prosecutor’s client because representing any other entity could
create a conflict of interest, something ethics rules forbid attorneys
from accepting.50  First, neither the Attorney General, nor the United
States attorney for the district is the client.  They, like all other federal
prosecutors, represent the United States.  A more difficult question
occurs when the President is the client.51  It is clear that federal prose-
cutors do not represent the individual filling the President’s role.
Should the President need personal representation, the President is
responsible for retaining counsel.52  However, the individual holds an
office.  Could the office of the President be the client?  As discussed
letter from future United States District Attorney Christopher Gore to Senator Rufus
King).
44. Id. at 109.
45. JACOBY, supra note 17, at 19–20.
46. Bloch, supra note 19, at 571–74.
47. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate (Sept. 24, 1789), in
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES (Dorothy Twohig ed. 1993).
The next day he filled New York and New Jersey as well as Attorney General Randolph.
Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate (Sept. 25, 1789), in THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993).
48. S. JOURNAL, 1ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 29–33 (1789).
49. 1 Stat. 73, § 35.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
51. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2004).
52. The most poignant example of this is the legal troubles that hampered the Clin-
ton administration throughout its two terms.  The legal problems resulted in Clinton’s
eventual trial for impeachment before the Senate.  At the impeachment trial, he was rep-
resented by deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills.  However, during the entire scan-
dal, Clinton also employed a personal attorney, Robert S. Bettett. See Eric Fuchs, Where Are
They Now: The Stars of the Clinton Impeachment Scandal, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 2, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-are-clinton-impeachment-lawyers-now-2014-4.
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below, the President’s office represents the entire United States.53  The
President, theoretically, embodies the people’s will.  Initially, there was
little difference between the United States and the President.54  The
President was presumed to act in the national interest.  Historical prac-
tice, however, has demonstrated this is not always the case.55  At times,
the President has stood in opposition to the government.56  This divi-
sion led to the increased importance of the White House counsel.57
This person represents the office of the President.58
Due to the divide between the office of the President and the
United States, for federal prosecutors to represent the United States,
there must be a clear dividing point between the office of the President
and United States.  That divide is policy.  Those entering the presidency
do so with a policy agenda.59  Accomplishing the agenda requires law
enforcement decisions.  Often this requires certain laws to be enforced
more vigorously than others.60  As the government’s lawyers, federal
prosecutors are responsible for enforcement.  Sometimes new or devel-
oping situations arise that require presidential action.  Administrations
must adopt policies to address these new or developing situations.  At
other times, enforcement of existing laws must be more stringent.  In
order to represent the United States, federal prosecutors must enforce
these laws.
Enforcing policy, and only enforcing policy, differs from represent-
ing the President as an office.  Most importantly, the difference
emerges when the President is at odds with the government.  This situa-
tion arises in criminal matters when the President, or a high-ranking
administration official, violates the law.61  When that occurs, federal
prosecutors prosecute the executive branch.62  This does not, however,
require that they no longer enforce administration policies.
Prosecutors, like all other attorneys, have a client.  Today’s
prosecutorial environment makes the identity of the prosecutor’s client
53. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
54. DAVID HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, WASHINGTON’S CIRCLE: THE CREATION OF
THE PRESIDENT (2015) (ebook); GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 131 (Wilson Carey McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1993).
55. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in
Constitutional Policy, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Bruce Ackerman, Abolish the White House Counsel: And the Office of Legal Counsel,
too, while we’re at it, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_polit-
ics/jurisprudence/2009/04/abolish_the_white_house_counsel.single.html; Rabkin, supra
note 55, at 63–65.
59. Willard M. Oliver, The Pied Piper of Crime in America: An Analysis of the Presidents’
and Public’s Agenda on Crime, 13 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 139, 140–41 (2002).
60. See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.
671 (2014); Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013).
61. The most recent example of this are the allegations of torture permitted by the
G.W. Bush administration.  Despite calls for prosecution, the Department of Justice
decided not to pursue criminal prosecution. See Fran Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the
Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 271 (2010).
62. Rabkin, supra note 55, at 76–77.
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ambiguous.  However, based on the terms of the Judiciary Act that cre-
ated federal prosecutors, federal prosecutors clearly represent the
United States government.
III. REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
What does it mean to represent the United States government in a
criminal case?  Other attorneys represent their client’s interests,
whatever they may be.  What is the United States government’s interest
in a criminal case?  According to the United States Supreme Court, the
United States Attorney represents a sovereign who has an obligation to
govern impartially.63  Its interest in a criminal case goes beyond win-
ning, but also ensuring that justice is done.64  In the next sentence, the
Court states that the prosecutor is a servant of the law, ensuring that the
guilty are convicted and that the innocent are set free.65  While this
works well as an ideal, it fails to adequately define what it means to
represent the government.  Within these oft-quoted sentences the
Court identifies not only the United States government as the prosecu-
tor’s client, but also the law.  The United States government is certainly
not synonymous with the law.  Therefore, determining what it means to
represent the United States government in a criminal prosecution
requires us to look deeper than a few sentences in a Supreme Court
opinion.
This section begins by examining the nature of representation.  In
the United States, representation begins with the people who select rep-
resentatives.  Once selected, representatives must decide how to
represent their constituents.  Must representatives adhere to instruc-
tions from their constituents or do representatives have freedom to
decide what is in the constituency’s best interests?  Those whose views
prevailed during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 had a specific
answer.  They believed representatives should act in the national inter-
est and they ensured this by insulating government officials from the
public will.  This insulation permits prosecutors to act in the national
interest without regard to public desires, at least for the most part.
A. The Nature of Representation
Understanding what it means to represent the United States gov-
ernment requires understanding the nature of republican govern-
ments.  Working for a republican government requires that federal
prosecutors understand and act in accordance with the national gov-
ernment’s interests.  As the government, itself, represents “the people,”
any discussion about representing the federal government must include
how the federal government represents the people.  In a republican
government, the people possess sovereignty.66  Hence the Constitution
63. Berger v. United, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Bernard Yack, Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism, 29 POL. THEORY 517 (2001).
The Founders themselves never used the term “popular sovereignty.”  Instead, it has
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begins, “We the People of the United States . . . .”67  While the people
are sovereign they have delegated their sovereign power to the govern-
ment through representatives.68  This section looks at the theoretical
notions connected with popular sovereignty.  How do the people gov-
ern themselves?  How do they express their desires?  Other scholars
have sought answers to these questions.  This section outlines their
work and applies it to federal prosecutors.
In the years following independence, Americans experimented
with republican forms of government.  While the mechanics differed,
they agreed that a republican form of government derived its power
from the people.69  Problems arose when applying this concept to prac-
tical governing.  Solutions followed a continuum from direct govern-
ance to indirect governance.  Direct governance meant the people
made their own decisions.70  Indirect governance meant the people
selected representatives who made decisions for the people.  The dis-
tance between the people and their representative, measured by the
number of selection layers between the people and their representative,
varied.71  Few places utilized direct governance because it was impracti-
cal for all but the smallest towns.  While indirect representation worked
better with larger populations, it brought a variety of contested issues.72
Direct governance worked only in small locations such as New
England towns.73  During the colonial period and the years following
independence, towns made decisions as a group.  If the town needed a
new road, the people decided first whether it was necessary and then
decided its path.  These discussions often took place at town hall meet-
ings.  The residents gathered at a pre-determined time and place to
discuss the matter.
At the state or national level direct representation was not viable.
There was not one time and one place where a large number of people
could gather to discuss matters.  Meetings were necessary to decide
become a label attached to the role of the people in exercising the sovereign power of a
nation. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 (2004).
67. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
68. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sover-
eignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749–50
(1993–1994) (arguing that the structure of the government’s daily operations derives
from “the people” and that a majority of them have the power to alter it).
69. Horst Dippel, The Changing Idea of Popular Sovereignty in Early American Constitu-
tionalism: Breaking Away from European Patterns, 16 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 21, 26–27
(1996).
70. KRAMER, supra note 66, at 5–6.
71. The Virginia governor position in the 1780s exemplifies this well.  While the
people selected members of the legislature, the legislature selected the governor.  This
made the governor a step removed from the people. See JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RAN-
DOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY 87 (1974).
72. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 237–47 (1988).
73. JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW
NATION IN CRISIS 21–22 (1993).
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future meeting locations and times.74  Inevitably, scheduling conflicts
developed.  No matter the place selected, some people had to travel
greater distances than others.  Travel distances could determine
whether someone attended or not.  Coinciding with the geographic size
problem, the deliberative process slowed considerably.  The sheer num-
ber of people meant more speakers wanting their say.  Logistics also
slowed the process.  Committees formed and reported back to the
group.  This necessitated subsequent meetings, slowing the process fur-
ther.  Finally, the larger size led to greater heterogeneity within the
population.  The small New England towns were highly homogeneous,
leaving few philosophical differences.75  When differences arose, peo-
ple reached compromises.  Expanding beyond homogenous towns,
however, introduced cultural and philosophical differences.  These dif-
ferences were more foundational and entrenched.  Compromises were
not easily achieved, if achieved at all.
With direct governance impractical, people resorted to indirect
governance.  Indirect governance required representation, which
brought a collection of questions.  The first involved selection.  Who
selects and how?  The second was whom or what does the representative
represent?  Should the person represent the interests of the local group
that selected the representative or should that person act in the best
interests of the larger body?  Similarly, a decision had to be made about
the size of the represented area.  Should it encompass multiple towns
or places?  Finally, decisions had to be made about the degree of indi-
rect representation.  How many layers to place between the individual
and the representative?
1. Selecting the Representative
There was no question, even among the most conservative Ameri-
cans, that the people would select representatives.76  This still left ques-
tions.  When do they select the representatives?  Which people make
the selection?  Whom do they select?  The first two questions apparently
were not considered in much depth following independence.77  Peo-
ple, usually property owning males, selected representatives when nec-
74. There were several “conventions” leading to the 1787 Constitutional Conven-
tion.  For example, in 1786, five states met to discuss commerce, which led to a suggestion
for another convention for a wider purpose. Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions
and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments”, 65 FLA. L. REV.
618, 671–74 (2013).
75. SHARP, supra note 73, at 21–22; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830
(1975).
76. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 133 (1989).
77. Based on present legal and historical scholarship the questions of voting rights
beyond property owning males and how often they should vote are not discussed fre-
quently. See, e.g., SHARP, supra note 73; Dippel, supra note 69.
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essary.78  Answers to the third question differed during the years
between independence and the Constitution.
People disagreed about who should represent specific localities.
Many people believed local elites should rule.79  Elites possessed certain
qualities.  Beyond their status as property owning white males, they
were educated, which meant they were well-read.80  For many, this
meant they read law, philosophy, and science.  More important, how-
ever, they had sufficient wealth to insulate themselves from deciding
policy matters based upon self-interest.81  Many believed that the only
people qualified to represent others were those who could set aside self-
interest.  By setting aside self-interest, they could act in the polity’s best
interest.  Few met these criteria.  In the years following independence,
the criteria for becoming a representative expanded.  Those who lacked
elite status became representatives.82  From the elite’s perspective,
these new representatives acted on self-interest and shifted their posi-
tions based on popular passions.83  From the perspective of these new
representatives, they finally had the opportunity to speak on their own
behalf and for their own interests.84  To them, for a republic to survive,
wealth had to be equally distributed.85
2. How to Represent
These different perspectives about the qualities of representatives
spilled over to a second question.  How do representatives represent
their locations?86  Two competing answers emerged.  The first asserted
that representatives represented their locations by advocating the loca-
tion’s interests.  The second asserted that representatives must look
beyond their location’s narrow interests and act on behalf of the whole
group.  These competing answers went to the heart of the American
notion of republican government, and, therefore, how prosecutors
would represent the government.
Those who sided with the first answer perceived representatives as
members of the group that the representative represented.  This con-
78. TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE
TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4 (2007).
79. REID, supra note 76, at 65–66; SHARP, supra note 73, at 2–3; Richard R. Beeman,
Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America, 49
THE WM. & MARY Q. 401, 401 (1992).
80. Beeman, supra note 79, at 401.
81. Id.; GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815 158–59 (2009).
82. WOOD, supra note 81, at 20–21.  Not everyone believed a convention to revise
the Articles of Confederation was necessary.  They were satisfied with the current system.
Generally, these were the newly-minted middle class who gained from the benefits associ-
ated with their new power. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 131 (2008).
83. Wood, supra note 81, at 20–21; FRITZ, supra note 82, at 128–129.
84. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 124.
85. BOUTON, supra note 78, at 6.
86. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 203–205 (1996).
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trasted markedly with the British conception of representation.87  The
British saw representatives as representing land, not people.88  Ameri-
cans believed representatives represented a collection of people on the
land.89  Representatives, under this conception, came from the people
and understood their interests.90  They represented these interests to
the larger body.  They also understood their problems.  When meeting
with the larger body, the representative presented these problems for
resolution by the larger body.91  Similarly, when the larger body raised
a collective problem, the representative knew how the represented peo-
ple wanted it resolved.
This raises the second answer to how representatives represented.
When questions of the larger group—in this case the nation—arose,
some believed the representatives should act in the nation’s best inter-
ests instead of the local group’s interest.92  Whenever a representative
(or representatives) was necessary, it meant meeting with a larger group
for a larger purpose.  Purposes ranged from a commission to solve a
specific problem to a convention to deal with a general issue, or a legis-
lative session designed to make laws for the larger group.
The dilemma between local and national interests arose most
poignantly when representatives received instructions from the repre-
sented group.93  One initial question was whether such instructions
were binding on the representative.  Different groups and individuals
sent these instructions.  It is likely that some were contradictory.
Which, if any, bound the representative?  Ultimately, while the Consti-
tution protected free speech and the right to petition, representatives
were left to decide how to handle instructions from represented
groups.
Answering whether to represent the local interest or the national
interest became much more complicated as the size of the represented
area increased.  Towns were relatively homogeneous.  As represented
areas grew, representatives represented multiple towns, each with dif-
ferent and potentially conflicting interests.  Even if interests did not
directly conflict, the representative might have to trade someone’s
interest in one instance to benefit someone else’s interest in another
instance.
This creates the denominator problem.94  Who are the people?
The representative must decide which people to listen to and which to
ignore.  This relates to the instructions issue.  If the instructions come
from a group at odds with the representative’s desires, the representa-
87. See REID, supra note 76, at 28–29.
88. Id. at 32.
89. J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 53 (1966).
90. REID, supra note 76, at 65–66.
91. Id. at 129–133.
92. RAKOVE, supra note 86, at 205.
93. REID, supra note 76, at 99; FRITZ, supra note 82, at 125–128.
94. See Amar, supra note 68.
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tive might ignore the instructions.95  Similarly, the representative might
follow instructions from a group with which the representative agrees.
The same could occur between powerful interests.  If forced to choose
between two interests, the representative might choose the more power-
ful one.
The amount of consideration a representative gives to the people
changes based on the degree of separation between the representative
and the people.  As the degree of separation increases, the representa-
tion becomes less direct, making representatives less connected to the
people’s will.  The greater distance between the people and the repre-
sentative means that the representative is more insulated from popular
will.
Three key concepts emerge from this that are relevant to federal
prosecutors.  First, prosecutors must consider interests.  Do they pursue
local interests or do they act on behalf of national interests?  Today, this
poses one of the greatest dilemmas for federal prosecutorial decision-
making.96  Second, regardless of whose interests they follow, federal
prosecutors are insulated from popular will as they are several degrees
removed from election.  This means prosecutors can act freely, without
significant consideration of the public’s desires.  Finally, they must
decide how to handle instructions.  Though insulated, the prosecutor
must still consider public opinion because the public will sit on juries
and decide cases.  Therefore, public demands must play some role.
Prosecutors also receive instructions from the United States govern-
ment.  Prosecutors, as attorneys for the government, must follow these
instructions.  As a result, prosecutors serve the government more than
the people.
B. Representation in the Constitution
Against this backdrop, state representatives met in Philadelphia
during the summer of 1787 to address the shortcomings of the Articles
of Confederation.  Each state, with the exception of Rhode Island, sent
delegates.  Soon after beginning, the convention’s true purpose
emerged.  The Articles of Confederation were to be replaced with a
new national government.97  As the delegates designed the govern-
ment, they grappled with questions raised by representation theory.
How much of a voice should the people have in a national government?
Deciding this required reconciling two competing groups holding dif-
ferent notions about representation.98
Prior to independence, Americans of all sorts heard the rallying cry
for a voice in government.  Even those not part of the elite classes
95. REID, supra note 76, at 102–03.
96. For a summary of the relationship between the U.S. Attorney Offices and the
Justice Department, see Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attor-
neys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 397–409 (2009).
97. WOOD, supra note 81, at 31.
98. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 3–5.
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believed their voices mattered.99  Following independence, state legisla-
tures became the focal point for the debate about representation.100
They expanded to include voices from those not of the elite ruling class
based on the idea that ruling was not the exclusive domain of elites.101
These new representatives lacked education, wealth, and reason.102
When considering policy choices, they chose self-interest or sectional
interest over national interest.103  Those in the ruling class saw these
state legislatures as dangerous to the United States.104  For America to
survive, it needed a stronger national presence, one insulated from
democratic excess.
People perceived these new state legislatures differently.  Support-
ers of state legislatures tended to be agrarian.  Their political views were
more radical while their economic views were more traditional.105
They believed they could govern themselves without resorting to
“heavy” government.106  Many lived on farms, and their interests and
concerns differed from those who lived in the growing cities and towns.
They were unaware of the growing merchant class that made its living
on commerce.  Their perception of America also differed, seeing it as
thirteen independent states joining for collective security.107
Opponents of state legislatures saw the legislative actions taken as a
consequence of democratic excess.108  “Common” people had too
much influence.  Rather than govern based on common interest, state
legislatures responded only to rapidly changing popular passions.  The
ruling elites believed that a national government was necessary to
restrain these popular passions.109  Without proper restraint, they
argued, the nation would collapse from sectional in-fighting.  Inherent
in this perspective was the idea that the United States was a whole, a
single nation rather than thirteen independent states.110  Adherents to
this view met to form the United States Constitution.
99. SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE CULTURE
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 5–6 (1997).
100. See HURST, supra note 37, at 23–25.
101. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 124.
102. Id.; WOOD, supra note 81, at 27–28.
103. MORGAN, supra note 72, at 254.
104. WOOD, supra note 81, at 19, 31.  Wood states: “[B]y the 1780s many leaders had
come to realize that the Revolution had unleashed social and political forces that they
had not anticipated and that the ‘excesses of democracy’ threatened the very essence of
their republican revolution.” Id. at 19.
105. Thomas Jefferson is the prime example of this “country” viewpoint.  He vehe-
mently disliked the mercantile interests and stock jobbers that were emerging at this time.
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 132–33 (1996).
For a description of the “country” viewpoint and its contrast to the “court” mentality, see
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC, 1788–1800 14–24 (1993).
106. Jefferson referred to governments as “heavy” or “light” depending on how
much coercion they used on the people. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 134.
107. WOOD, supra note 81, at 7.
108. Id. at 19–20.
109. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 117–18, 122.
110. WOOD, supra note 81, at 53–54.
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The delegates to the Constitutional Convention wanted a govern-
ment where the people had a voice; they simply wanted to limit that
voice.111  To accomplish this the delegates used two devices.  They
divided government powers amongst three branches: the legislative,
executive, and judicial.  Separating these powers demonstrated their
commitment to a government by the people.  By separating the powers,
the delegates hoped to prevent any one person or group from accumu-
lating too much power.112  Once they accomplished this, their second
device involved varying the degrees of representation.  This gave the
people a strong voice in some instances but restrained it in others.
The combination of separating powers and varying degrees of rep-
resentation is seen most clearly in the legislative branch.  Congress has
two houses.  The delegates made the House of Representatives closest
to the people.  Members represented a specific area and number of
people.  The people selected these representatives directly through
elections held every two years.  The Senate was a step removed from the
people because its members were elected by state legislatures.  While
the people selected state legislators, the people lacked a voice when the
legislature chose the Senators.113  Senators were, essentially, the repre-
sentatives of the state legislatures.  Combining this with six-year terms
made Senators more insulated from public opinion than House
members.
The executive branch and its connection to the people became
one of the more difficult challenges the delegates faced.  It emerged
when they debated the relationship between the executive and the leg-
islature.114  Ultimately the delegates disconnected the executive and
legislative branches.  This forced them to determine whether the peo-
ple should directly elect the executive.  The delegates insulated the
executive from direct election through an electoral college.115  The
people chose electors who then met to choose the executive.116  The
person selected as President served a four-year term.117  As a single
executive, not connected to the legislature, the President became the
only person representing the entire nation’s interests.
Among the three branches, the judicial branch was most insulated
from the people.  As New York delegate Alexander Hamilton later
111. KRAMER, supra note 66, at 5–6; see also FRITZ, supra note 82, at 7.
112. Dippel, supra note 69, at 29.
113. In 1912, Congress passed the Seventeenth Amendment which made Senators
directly elected by the people.  The states ratified the amendment in 1913. The Constitu-
tion: Amendments 11–27, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (2016), https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/amendments-11-27 (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
114. The differing views of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison illustrate this
point.  Together, they drafted most of the Federalist Essays and strongly supported ratifi-
cation of the Constitution.  However, they conceived of executive power differently.
Hamilton believed a strong national government was necessary and that the Executive
had the potential to be most powerful.  Madison, on the other hand, saw the Executive as
a mediator between conflicting interests and ensuring the legislature did not abuse its
power. See WOOD, supra note 81, at 32–33, 72.
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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wrote in The Federalist, the judiciary was the least dangerous branch of
the three.118  The President selected judges.119  This made federal
judges two steps removed from the people.  The advice and consent of
the Senate did not make federal judges any closer to the people, as the
Senators themselves were a step removed.  To further insulate federal
judges, the delegates gave them life tenure.120  Despite insulation, the
judiciary was least dangerous because judicial authority was limited.
Colonial courts were governing bodies that not only resolved cases but
made binding decisions about town administration.121  The Constitu-
tion, however, removed their policymaking role, permitting them to
hear only “cases or controversies” arising under the Constitution.122
Once they decided these cases, they had no enforcement power.  This
was left to the executive.
With the three-branch framework complete, a committee drafted a
document that became the Constitution.  Not every delegate signed it,
thus signaling a contentious ratification process.  Anti-Federalists, those
who opposed ratification, made two broad arguments.123  First, many
feared the national government’s power.  Nothing in the Constitution
guaranteed the people’s rights and liberties.  Second, the opponents
believed the Constitution went too far when insulating the government
from the popular will.124  Despite these objections, at state ratification
conventions, other representatives voted to adopt the new Constitution.
Many believed this made the new government “of the people” and that
the people’s voice was now limited to elections.  Others believed the
people had avenues other than approving the Constitution and electing
representatives to voice their beliefs about government policies and
actions.
Federal prosecutors found themselves connected to all three
branches.  Their creation in the Judiciary Act gave the impression that
they were judicial figures.  This corresponded with the state practice.
However, it was also clear that federal prosecutors were executive offi-
cials.  The President appointed them and they represented the United
States.  Finally, the Senate had to approve the President’s choices.  This,
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Whoever attentively considers
the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they
are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in
a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but
holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.”).
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
120. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
121. NELSON, supra note 75, at 13–14.
122. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
123. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 137, 142–43.
124. Id. at 145–46.
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in a small way at least, connected prosecutors to the legislative branch.
How prosecutors would function in their new role and their connection
to the people was left to the first executive administration under the
Constitution: the Washington administration.
C. The Washington Administration’s Representatives: Selecting United States
District Attorneys
Upon assuming office in 1789, George Washington understood the
precedent-setting nature of his role.125  One key precedent was the rela-
tionship between the people and the federal government.  Having led
the Continental Army during the war and chaired the Constitutional
Convention, Washington was firmly in the Federalist camp and sup-
ported a strong federal government.126  At the same time, he was sensi-
tive to the people’s fears that the national government could become
monarchical.  Therefore, Washington sought to balance his ideology
with the people’s fears.  As he sought this balance, factions developed
inside his administration that questioned what it meant to represent the
people.
Washington hoped to allay the people’s concerns with symbolic
actions.  On his inaugural journey from Mount Vernon to New York,
Washington refused favors from citizens, staying in public lodgings
rather than private homes.127  He did not want to fall beholden to any-
one.  Once in New York, he located and financed his own lodgings.
Once in office, he made his home open to the public.  Between Con-
gressional sessions, he took tours of the northern and southern
states.128  At each stop on these tours he met with the people, often
staying in public accommodations.  By doing these things, he brought
the government to the people.  His actions demonstrated the signifi-
cance of the people to the new nation.  Yet this was a top-down
approach.  Washington brought the government to the people, hoping
to generate respect for the new government.  These actions encapsu-
lated the approach he would take in federal law enforcement matters.
While Washington focused on reconciling competing external
viewpoints, he found himself doing the same internally as the public’s
divisions manifested themselves in his administration.  His Secretary of
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, and Secretary of State, Thomas Jeffer-
son, took opposing and irreconcilable views on the federal govern-
ment’s purpose and power.  By the late 1790s, the opposing views
formed political parties.  However, at the outset, Washington held the
rivals together based solely on his reputation and determination.129
125. PHELPS, supra note 54, at 127–31.
126. JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT FORGED A NATION
220–21 (2013).
127. HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 54, at 320.
128. WOOD, supra note 81, at 72–78 (discussing Washington’s understanding of the
symbolic nature of his work); PHELPS, supra note 54, at 127–28 (stating that Washington
took these tours in 1789 (to the northern states) and 1791 (to the southern states)).
129. SHARP, supra note 73, at 27; PHELPS, supra note 54, at 131.
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Washington’s ideological position aligned closer with Hamil-
ton’s.130  Both believed a strong national government was necessary to
not only preserve the Union but to also make the new nation stronger.
This meant centralizing power and insulating the federal government
from the people’s variable and conflicting desires.131  Hamilton
believed the Presidency had the most potential to accomplish this.132
Therefore, his proposals and actions emphasized presidential power by
stretching the Constitution’s words to their limits.  He established this
early in Washington’s administration by successfully gaining approval to
assume the state’s Revolutionary War debt and chartering the Bank of
the United States.133
Jefferson was Hamilton’s chief rival in the cabinet, differing in
their political ideology.  Where Hamilton feared the masses, Jefferson
put his faith in them.134  To Jefferson, the American government was a
great experiment in the people’s ability to rule themselves.  Liberty, he
believed, required that people be free from government.  While
accepting a position in the new national government and understand-
ing the need for a national government, Jefferson believed the design
gave the national government too much power.  He sought to limit the
national government’s reach to the specific terms written in the Consti-
tution itself.  This fundamental philosophical difference caused Jeffer-
son and Hamilton to clash at nearly every turn.
The fundamental divide between Jefferson and Hamilton resulted
from their opposing beliefs about the voice people should have in gov-
ernment.  Hamilton believed in a top-down approach where the gov-
ernment coerced the people’s compliance.135  Jefferson preferred a
bottom-up approach where the government answered to the people.136
In Hamilton’s view, the government spoke to the people through
actions.  In Jefferson’s view, the people spoke to the government
through elections and acts of popular sovereignty.  This distinction
formed the basis for the debate over the federal government’s law
enforcement powers, particularly neutrality enforcement in 1793.  This
debate created the precedent that the United States District Attorneys
represented the United States government and spoke to the people
through symbolic policy enforcement, rather than acting based upon
popular sovereignty or popular opinion.
130. FERLING, supra note 126, at 217–18.
131. ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 105, at 21–24.
132. WOOD, supra note 81, at 72.
133. ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 105, at 223–24, 232–33.
134. WOOD, supra note 81, at 10–12; ELLIS, supra note 105, at 113.
135. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 232 (2004) (“Of all the founders, Ham-
ilton probably had the gravest doubts about the wisdom of the masses and wanted elected
leaders who would guide them.”).
136. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 135.
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IV. SETTING THE PRECEDENT FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
REPRESENTING U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY
A. Law Enforcement Problems
As Washington’s first term drew to a close and the second one
began, the administration faced its first federal law enforcement issues.
Western Pennsylvanians began organized resistance to Hamilton’s whis-
key excise tax, refusing to pay and forcibly threatening others to pre-
vent them from paying.137  In August 1792, Hamilton learned about the
violent resistance to his whiskey tax in western Pennsylvania.  The reve-
nue inspector reported that the person who permitted the revenue col-
lector to remain in his house had been confronted by a group that
“drew a knife on him, threatened to scalp him, tar & feather him, and
finally to reduce his House and property to ashes if he did not solemnly
promise them to prevent the office of Inspection from being there.”138
Hamilton instructed the revenue inspector to investigate and seek pros-
ecution if warranted.139  On the same day, Hamilton wrote Washington
informing him of the situation.140  Hamilton proposed requesting
Attorney General Edmund Randolph to decide if an indictable crime
had occurred and, if so, whether to prosecute it during the upcoming
federal court session in York, Pennsylvania.141  Hamilton believed that
if there was evidence that a crime occurred, the government had to act
quickly and forcibly through the courts.  Randolph wasted little time
responding.142  Having perused Carolina and Pittsburgh newspapers as
his information source, Randolph concluded that the acts committed
were acts of free expression and not punishable by the Courts.143  Ham-
ilton was not deterred and convinced Randolph to attend the next
court session.144  Randolph and United States District Attorney William
Rawle prepared and obtained indictments against several suspected
protesters.145  The cases were dismissed when further investigation
revealed mistaken identity.146
This small situation set the precedent for much of what would
occur during Henfield’s case.  Hamilton initiated enforcement and
137. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 113–16 (1986); ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 105, at 462–63.
138. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, vol. 12, JULY 1792?–?OCTOBER 1792
305–310 (1967) (citing a letter from John Neville to George Clymer, in possession of the
Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford).
139. Id.
140. Id. 311–13.
141. Id.
142. Id. 336–340.
143. Id.
144. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HIS-
TORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 30 (1937).
145. Id. But see MAEVA MARCUS, 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1897–1800 2, 306 (1988) (noting that the minutes for the
session are scarce and that there are no entries for any cases.  Apparently, as was fre-
quently the case, the court was brought to session, a grand jury was charged, and the next
day the session was completed because of the lack of business).
146. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 144, at 30.
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used people from his department to carry out law enforcement action.
Once he had some evidence, he directed the federal attorneys to pro-
ceed with the case.147  Despite their reluctance, which was based on
constitutional grounds, the attorneys proceeded with cases and
enforced administration policy.  The cases were dismissed only because
they had the wrong people.  Presumably this information came from
witnesses or defense attorneys.
While the administration discussed its response to the tax protes-
ters, events overseas diverted the administration’s attention.  French
revolutionaries deposed King Louis XVI.148  In the following months,
those same revolutionaries executed him and declared war on the rest
of Europe, including Great Britain.149  Washington responded by
declaring neutrality and proclaiming violators would be prosecuted.150
Enforcing neutrality created another Jefferson-Hamilton clash.  They
clashed over more than ideological differences but those came to the
fore.  Characteristically, Hamilton made the first move.  He drafted a
circular letter to the Customs Collectors instructing them to report neu-
trality violations directly to him.151  Prior to sending it, Hamilton
showed it to Washington who requested that Hamilton discuss it with
Jefferson and Randolph.152  Afterward, Jefferson objected to the
instructions.  Following the meeting, Jefferson expressed his objections
more fully in a letter to Randolph, describing a more people-centered
conception of federal law enforcement.153  Using the Customs Collec-
tors, Jefferson argued, made them a corps of spies.154  Instead, Jeffer-
son argued the government should rely on judges and grand jurors to
enforce neutrality laws.  Grand jurors were the constitutional investiga-
tors.  They had no interest in the outcome, and their work was public.
In this sense, the grand jurors represented the local jurisdiction where
the neutrality violation took place.  Customs Collectors, conversely, had
an incentive to make false allegations and were not answerable to the
public.  Hamilton, a Presidential appointee himself, appointed them.
This made the Customs Collectors four steps removed from the peo-
147. It is important to note here that the Attorney General was seen as subordinate
to the other cabinet officials at this time.  It was not until the spring of 1793 that the
Attorney General became a more significant figure. See infra notes 218–19; BLOCH, supra
note 19, at 571.
148. SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 614–15
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1989).
149. Id. at 668–69.
150. Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), in 12 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 16 JANUARY 1793?–?31 MAY 1793 472–74 (Christine Stern-
berg Patrick & John C. Pinheiro eds., 2005).
151. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8, 1793), in 25
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Jan. 1–May 10, 1793, 691–92 (John Catanzariti ed.,
1992) (The draft circular letter cannot be located.  We know it exists from the letter
writing and meetings it generated.).
152. Id. at 667–68.
153. Id. at 691–92.
154. Id.
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ple.155  Randolph wrote back to Jefferson agreeing with Jefferson in
principle but with Hamilton in practice.  Randolph made one key alter-
ation, however.156  Rather than have the Customs Collectors report to
Hamilton, Randolph proposed that the Customs Collectors work
directly with the United States District Attorneys.157  As usual with neu-
trality matters, Randolph’s position prevailed.158
B. Ensuring Compliance from Washington’s Attorneys
During the spring and summer of 1793, the United States found
itself between the warring French and British powers.  Not wanting to
join the war, the Washington administration proclaimed neutrality and
warned American citizens not to assist either side.  Making this procla-
mation proved simpler than enforcing it.  Citizens attempted to aid
both sides forcing the administration and its prosecutors to respond.
Comparing the administration’s response and the citizens’ actions
reveals a stark contrast.  While the government hoped to steer a neutral
course between the warring sides, most Americans wanted to support
France and many wanted to fight for it.  Prosecutors unquestionably
followed their client’s wishes, prosecuting cases as they saw fit.
Prosecutorial loyalty to the administration’s policies began when
Washington filled the newly-created United States District Attorney
positions in September 1789.  He selected local people who were loyal
to the new national government thus securing a group predisposed to
follow his instructions.  They executed these instructions during the
neutrality crisis despite strong public sympathies for the French.  The
people expressed their opinion in a variety of ways, but each time the
national government and its attorneys adhered to neutrality.  They did
this even with the knowledge that public support was necessary to suc-
cessfully prosecute cases.  Even when juries rejected their cases, federal
prosecutors continued enforcing neutrality according to administration
instructions.  This was hardly judicial or magisterial behavior.  These
federal prosecutors were advocates, changing their positions as the fed-
eral government developed its neutrality policy.
Immediately after Washington signed the Judiciary Act, he filled
the new attorney positions.159  Washington understood these initial
155. The people selected the Electoral College (first step).  The Electoral College
selected the president (second step).  The president selected the treasury secretary with
the Senate’s consent (third step).  The treasury secretary selected the customs collector
(fourth step).
156. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (May 9, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Jan. 1–May 10, 1793, 700–02 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992).
157. Id.
158. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 13, 1793) in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, May 11–Aug. 31, 1793, 25–27 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
159. Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph (28 September 1789),
in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, Sept. 8, 1789–Jan. 15, 1790, 106–09 (John Dor-
othy Twohig ed., 1993) (“Impressed with a conviction that the due administration of jus-
tice is the firmest pillar of good government, I have considered the first arrangement of
the judicial department as essential to the happiness of our country and to the stability of
its’ political system—hence the selection of the fittest characters to expound the laws, and
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selections were precedent-setting.160  He sought attorneys loyal to the
national government and who had strong local reputations.161  These
selections would be the new federal government’s representative in
each of the federal judicial districts.  The nominees included Pierpont
Edwards,162 who served in the role for sixteen years and as a federal
judge for twenty more; Christopher Gore,163 who later served as Massa-
chusetts Governor and United States Senator; Richard Harison,164
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s law partner for a time; and
John Marshall,165 the future Supreme Court Chief Justice.  Apparently,
Washington made the nominations without consulting the nominees.
In Kentucky, the nominee, George Nicholas,166 a friend of James
Madison, declined the nomination.  Washington’s second choice, James
Brown, also refused the nomination.167  John Marshall declined the
Virginia U.S. District Attorney position stating it would interfere with
his business in state courts.168  However, despite these few failures, most
of Washington’s initial appointments remained in their posts for several
years.  Those who left did so after receiving more prestigious federal
appointments.169
Washington’s appointees had some similarities.  First, several had
loyalist parents.  Christopher Gore’s family remained loyal to the Brit-
dispense justice, has been an invariable object of my anxious concern.”); see also WOOD,
supra note 81, at 86–88.
160. WOOD, supra note 81.
161. Id., at 107–09.  Selecting local attorneys also set a precedent that continues
today in the form of Senatorial courtesy.
162. Charles A. Heckman, A Jeffersonian Lawyer and Judge in Federalist Connecticut: The
Career of Pierpont Edwards, 28 CONN. L. REV. 669 (1996).
163. Gore, Christopher, (1758-1827), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS (2016), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000322
(last visited Oct. 26, 2016, 2:25 PM).
164. JULIUS L. GOEBEL, JR., 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCU-
MENTS AND COMMENTARY (1964).  The exact nature of their partnership is not clear.  Law
partnerships in the 1780s functioned differently than today.  Often, these partnerships
formed because of a case or a collection of cases.  It appears that Hamilton and Harison
both represented loyalists in New York following Independence and partnered in that
sense. Id. at 1–2, 231–32.
165. Letter from John Marshall to George Washington (14 October 1789), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, Sept. 8, 1789–Jan. 15, 1790, 192–93 (Dorothy Twohig
ed., 1993).
166. MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KEN-
TUCKY, 1789–1816 66–70 (2016) (discussing the numerous people who had rejected the
Kentucky position).
167. Id.
168. Letter from John Marshall to George Washington, supra note 164.  Apparently,
Washington spoke with a Samuel Griffin about various Virginians who would serve ably in
the national judicial offices.  Griffin put together a list, including Marshall. Conversation
with Samuel Griffin, 9 July 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Washington/05-03-02-0075 (last updated Oct. 5, 2016).  This would be the first of
three federal appointments that Marshall declined.  Washington sought to make Marshall
Attorney General and Adams sought to make Marshall an Associate Supreme Court Jus-
tice. See DAVID SCOTT ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE’S PROGRESS: JOHN MARSHALL FROM REVO-
LUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME COURT (2000).
169. Senate Journal, JOURNAL OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
amlaw/lwsj.html (listing Senate Journals from 1789–1801).
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ish.170  William Rawle, Pennsylvania’s second United States District
Attorney, came from loyalist parents as well.171  Abraham Ogden of
New Jersey came from a divided family, as did Attorney General
Edmund Randolph.172  Richard Harison, himself, had been a loyalist
and, as a result, lost his law license until the early 1780s.173  These loyal-
ist tendencies most likely pushed them toward strong centralized gov-
ernments.  Others served in the Revolutionary War.  John Sitgreaves,
from North Carolina, served as a Lieutenant.174  John Sherburne
served in the New Hampshire militia, rising to the rank of Major.175
This demonstrated their loyalty to Washington.  Most early federal pros-
ecutors also displayed early Federalist tendencies in the Hamilton/Jef-
ferson divide.  In Pennsylvania, a very Republican state, the first two
appointees, William Lewis176 and William Rawle,177 were Federalists.
Christopher Gore also emerged as a Federalist and championed the
cause long after it ceased to be politically popular.  This made them
ideologically compatible to the administration’s policies.
They had one other similarity: strong local reputations.  They came
from prominent families or had developed strong individual reputa-
tions.  All either were known to Washington or came personally recom-
mended by someone Washington had asked to provide
recommendations.  Two were sons of signers of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.178  One United States District Attorney taught law to his
predecessor in the office.179  Washington knew that for his choices to
represent the new government successfully, the United States District
Attorneys had to have the community’s respect.  If the public saw these
prominent local attorneys adhering to and enforcing new national laws,
the people would be less likely to oppose the new government and not
fear national power.  In this sense, the United States District Attorneys
not only filled a practical legal role in the new government but also
played a highly symbolic role.  Like Washington’s tour of the United
States, this was a top-down approach to federal government.
170. HELEN PINKNEY, CHRISTOPHER GORE, FEDERALIST OF MASSACHUSETTS,
1758–1827 5–7 (1969).
171. Rawle Family Papers, THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://hsp.
org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/findingaid0536rawle.pdf.
172. 4 ABRAHAM OGDEN, APPLETON’S CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 560
(James Grant Wilson & John Fiske eds., 1900).
173. Explanatory Note and Law License, Richard Harison Papers, Columbia Uni-
versity Library.
174. Sitgreaves, John, (1757-1802), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000459 (last vis-
ited Jan. 13, 2016).
175. Sherburne, John Samuel, (1757-1830), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000339
(last visited Jan 13, 2016).  Interestingly, Sherburne would leave office in December 1793
to take a Congressional seat as an anti-administration member.
176. ESTHER A. MCFARLAND & MICKEY HERR, WILLIAM LEWIS, ESQUIRE: ENLIGHTENED
STATESMAN, PROFOUND LAWYER, AND USEFUL CITIZEN (2012).
177. Rawle Family Papers, supra note 171.
178. The Founding Fathers: Delaware, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_delaware.html.
179. ABRAHAM OGDEN, supra note 172, at 560–61.
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C. Neutrality Enforcement
During the spring and summer of 1793, the neutrality crisis tested
respect earned by the new national government.  The situation was par-
ticularly acute in Philadelphia, the seat of the national government.
Reports of French privateering activities and Americans assisting in
those activities reached the Washington administration.180  After some
debate, the administration took law enforcement action.181  In the
midst of enforcement efforts, Washington sought the public’s opinion.
Yet the results seemingly had little impact on decision-making.  The
administration pressed on with prosecutions even as Americans aided
the French and ignored similar cases of aid to the British.  Even when
Gideon Henfield, the first of those prosecuted, was acquitted, the
administration continued enforcing neutrality despite the objections of
a significant number of the population.
1. Understanding Public Opinions
Washington and his cabinet knew successful policy enforcement
required public support.  Without it, the United States could easily be
pulled into the European war, something it had to avoid.182  Americans
took great interest in the French Revolution, but their opinions, like
Washington’s cabinet, were divided.  In February 1793, the French sent
a new minister to the United States named Edmond Charles Genet.183
Rather than go to Philadelphia, Genet landed at Charleston, South Car-
olina.184  When Genet arrived, the Charleston community’s French sup-
porters embraced him enthusiastically.  South Carolina’s Governor,
William Moultrie, formed a close relationship with Genet.185  Suppos-
edly, Genet queried Moultrie about outfitting privateers in Charleston.
Apparently, Moultrie responded that he knew of no law prohibiting
it.186  This encouraged Genet’s privateering activities.  Genet remained
180. British minister to the United States, George Hammond, wasted little time
informing the government whenever British ships fell prey to the French privateers. See,
e.g., Memorial from George Hammond (May 2, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: JAN. 1–MAY 10, 1793, 25–27 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992); Memorial from George
Hammond with Jefferson’s Notes (May, 8 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Jan. 1–May 10, 1793, 685–86 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992).
181. This debate took place over the course of a week.  Hamilton wanted to use the
Treasury Department to investigate the case.  Jefferson objected, preferring to use the
Grand Jury as an investigative body.
182. CHARLES MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET
GOVERNMENT 14–17 (1931).
183. HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION 19, 31 (1973).
184. WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF
FIGHTING SAIL 35 (2006).
185. C.L. BRAGG, CRESCENT MOON OVER CAROLINA: WILLIAM MOULTRIE AND AMERI-
CAN LIBERTY 256 (2013); ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 105, at 335; CASTO, supra note
184, at 45–47.  This conversation occurred not only before Moultrie had notice of Wash-
ington’s proclamation but before Washington even issued the proclamation.
186. The “supposedly” and “apparently” are used in this context because the only
evidence that this conversation occurred comes from a report Genet sent to the French
Government.  It is possible that Genet exaggerated, perhaps even fabricated, this event in
order to justify his actions to his government.  For more on the context of this report, see
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several days preparing privateers.  While most Charleston residents sup-
ported Genet’s activities, some factions strongly opposed French priva-
teering.  As a port city, many merchants relied upon British commerce
for survival.187  French privateering disrupted this trade.  The affected
merchants complained and rumors of Moultrie’s potential impeach-
ment circulated.188
After ten days in Charleston, Genet began a twenty-eight-day land
journey to Philadelphia.189  Along the way, he enjoyed enthusiastic pub-
lic reception in each town he visited.190  Genet perceived this as the
embodiment of American support for France and, therefore, indicative
of America’s policy toward France.  The parties and festivals continued
when he arrived in Philadelphia on May 18th.  Popular sentiment in
Philadelphia strongly favored France, so upon Genet’s arrival large
numbers of people celebrated and marched through the Philadelphia
streets to Genet’s lodgings.  They delivered welcoming addresses sup-
porting his mission.191  That night the welcoming committee hosted a
large celebration with toasts honoring Genet and the success of the
French Republic.192
Newly-formed Democratic-Republican societies organized these
events and demonstrations.193  These societies sought to fill the emerg-
ing gap between the people and the government.  They publicly
announced their formation through politically-sympathetic newspapers.
Other newspapers copied the story, thus bringing national attention to
the movement.194  While not intended as partisan, the groups emerged
as opposition to Hamilton’s Federalist policies.  By uniting like minds
across the country, they also bridged the gap that had formed between
national interests and local interests.195  The societies, in their infancy
during the neutrality crisis, passed and publicized resolutions hoping to
influence the administration.  One of the first organizations was the
Democratic Society in Philadelphia.196  It maintained close ties to the
Friends of Liberty and Equality.197  This latter group sold subscriptions
Letter from William Vans Murray to Alexander Hamilton (May 8, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Feb.–June 1793, 425–28 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969); see also
BRAGG, supra note 184, at 356–58.
187. ROBERT J. ALDERSON, JR., THE BRIGHT ERA OF HAPPY REVOLUTIONS: FRENCH
CONSUL MICHEL-ANGE-BERNARD MANGOURIT AND INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICANISM IN
CHARLESTON 1792–1794 40–53 (2008); BRAGG, supra note 185, at 256–57; CASTO, supra
note 184, at 46–47.
188. BRAGG, supra note 185, at 158.
189. AMMON, supra note 183, at 45.
190. ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 105, at 335.
191. Id. at 342.
192. Christopher J. Young, Connecting the President and the People: Washington’s Neu-
trality, Genet’s Challenge, and Hamilton’s Fight for Public Support, 31 J. EARLY REPUB. 435, 443
(2011).
193. Albrecht Koschnik, The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and the Limits of the
American Public Sphere, circa 1793–1795, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 615 (2001).
194. Id. at 622.
195. Id. at 617.
196. Id. at 619.
197. Id. at 618–19.
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to support the French military and held celebrations honoring French
victories.
With Republicans celebrating Genet’s arrival, Hamilton and the
Federalists began countering these demonstrations.198  Unable to
match the size and volume of Genet’s supporters, Hamilton rallied Phil-
adelphia merchants.  They marched to the President’s house and
presented Washington with an address supporting the neutrality
proclamation.
Faced with conflicting demonstrations, Washington sought a wider
sample of opinions.  Washington directed Attorney General Edmund
Randolph to conduct two surveys.  First, Randolph spoke with Philadel-
phia merchants about compensating Great Britain for the vessels
French privateers seized.199  Randolph returned and informed Wash-
ington that the merchants in Philadelphia were themselves not well
informed about the issue; however, generally speaking, they were
predisposed to support Great Britain.200  Other citizens, according to
Randolph, opposed restitution.201  The second survey required a more
extensive journey as Washington sent Randolph south through Dela-
ware, Maryland, and Virginia to gauge opinions on neutrality.202  In
many of the places he stopped, Randolph attended the general court
sessions where he found people of every sort.203  He surveyed their
reactions to the neutrality proclamation and made efforts to correct
misperceptions.204  In Maryland, he found many were concerned about
French privateering activity as the privateers had used Maryland to hide
vessels.205  He made efforts to reassure the people and believed he did
so.206  As Randolph ventured south, he encountered concerns about
Hamilton.207  Randolph also spoke to several people about Henfield’s
prosecution.208  He reported that people were initially opposed to the
198. THOMAS, supra note 182, at 89.
199. REARDON, supra note 71, at 230.  This is perhaps one of the first incidents of
the undefined responsibilities of federal prosecutors.  Taking a survey of merchants and
meeting with the citizenry to educate and persuade them on policy matters goes beyond
representing the United States in court and providing legal advice to the departments.
For implications this has for today’s prosecutors, see Laurie Levenson, Working Outside the
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 553, 555–57
(1998).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 232.
203. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (June 24, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, June 1–August 31, 1793, 137–42 (Christine Stern-
berg Patrick, ed., 2007); Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (June 11,
1793), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, June 1–August 31, 1793, 60–62 (Chris-
tine Sternberg Patrick, ed., 2007).
204. Id.
205. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (June 11, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, June 1–August 31, 1793, 60–62 (Christine Sternberg
Patrick, ed., 2007).
206. Id.
207. Letter to George Washington from Edmund Randolph (Jun. 24, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 137–42 (Christine Sternberg Patrick, ed., 2007).
208. Id.
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case; however, as he informed them of the case facts, they indicated that
Randolph provided evidence that they had not heard previously.209
This, according to Randolph, changed their minds about the case.210
Ultimately, Randolph concluded that those who opposed the proclama-
tion were those who had opposed ratification of the Constitution five
years prior.211
In addition to Randolph’s excursions, Washington’s administration
received letters and petitions from various parts of the nation expres-
sing either individual or collective opinions about neutrality.  Petition-
ing in this manner had become increasingly common as citizens
compiled grievances and suggested resolutions.212  Even before the
neutrality proclamation was issued, a Boston merchant wrote Hamilton
inquiring, “If the Executive could by proclamation inform the public on
this Subject it would do great good, or prevent much mischief.  Will not
the Citizens be prohibited from taking any part under cover or openly?
Some of our old adventurers in privateering who are again reduced will
require a tight Rein to prevent them.”213  In June, as the controversy
intensified, others voiced their opinions.  Henry Lee, Virginia’s Gover-
nor, expressed concern that American citizens aiding France might dis-
rupt British relations.214  Samuel Smith, a Maryland merchant who
would begin his term in the U.S. House in December, offered his sup-
port for the neutrality proclamation and his opposition to permitting
the French to sell their prizes in American ports.  Both Smith and Lee
stated their concerns in the context of “true friends of this country.”  In
Lee’s case, Hamilton forwarded the letter to Washington as evidence of
the public’s opinion on the matter.  Groups also sent petitions to Presi-
dent Washington in the form of resolutions from various town meet-
ings.  Washington read them and gratefully responded.
2. Administration Policy Enforcement
Though Washington undoubtedly was concerned about the pub-
lic’s perception, the nation’s security took precedence.  The administra-
209. Id.
210. Id. While it is never explicitly stated and Washington’s reaction to Randolph’s
reports is not known, one wonders if the government would have proceeded with the case
had Randolph not believed that he persuaded those whom he met.  It is possible that
Randolph’s reports gave the administration reason to think that their prosecution of
Henfield might be successful once the evidence was heard.
211. Id.
212. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigal Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998).
213. Letter to Alexander Hamilton from Stephen Higginson (Apr. 10, 1973), in 14
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305–306 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).  Higginson
was a Boston merchant and a one-time member of the Continental Congress.  Once Ham-
ilton became Treasury Secretary, Higginson often wrote to Hamilton informing him
about various matters.
214. Letter to George Washington from Henry Lee (Jun. 14, 1793), in 13 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77–80 (Christine Sternberg Patrick, ed., 2007).  For the
various posts held by Lee, see Lee, Henry, (1756–1818), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
L000195.
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tion had to respond to neutrality violations.  Cabinet discussions
focused on individual cases as reports of French privateering activities
arose so quickly that the cabinet could not craft an overarching policy.
Yet, while they discussed individual cases, broader ideas arose.  Hamil-
ton, recognizing that his revenue officials were the closest to the scene,
proposed that the government use them to report on violations.  He
offered to collect their reports, review them, and send the most serious
violations to the United States District Attorneys for prosecution.
Predictably, Jefferson opposed this arrangement, proposing
instead that the Grand Jury investigate and initiate prosecutions.
According to Jefferson:
Grand jurors are the constitutional inquisitors and informers of
the country, they are scattered every where, see every thing, see it
while they suppose themselves mere private persons, and not with
the prejudiced eye of a permanent and systematic spy.  Their
information is on oath, is public, it is in the vicinage of the party
charged, and can be at once refuted.  These officers taken only
occasionally from among the people, are familiar to them, the
office respected, and the experience of centuries has shewn [sic]
that it is safely entrusted with our character, property and liberty.
A grand juror cannot carry on systematic persecution against a
neighbor whom he hates, because he is not permanent in the
office.215
Jefferson sought to adopt state criminal practice for the federal courts.
In the states, grand juries investigated alleged criminal acts.216  From a
mix of practical, political, and ideological motives, Jefferson saw no rea-
son for law enforcement to work differently at the federal level.
Faced with a conflict between Hamilton and Jefferson, Washington
turned to Attorney General Randolph for a solution.  Randolph found
a “hair to split” and crafted a compromise.217  First, he recognized the
practicality and benefit of using revenue officials to identify viola-
tions.218  They were on-site at the ports and already identified all vessels
entering and leaving the ports.  Even if Jefferson’s grand jury idea was
adopted, revenue officials would most likely appear as government wit-
nesses.  Using them to report violations was not a significant difference.
Randolph also understood Jefferson’s fear of giving Hamilton even
more power to craft neutrality policy in a pro-British manner.  Ran-
dolph, therefore, proposed that revenue officials report directly to the
United States District Attorney who would decide whether to prosecute
the case.  Not only did this strike a sort of compromise between Jeffer-
215. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 691–92 (John Catanzariti, ed., 1992).
216. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634–1941 38–40 (1963); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 590 (1960).
217. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 13, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 25–27 (John Catanzariti, ed., 1995).
218. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from Edmund Randolph (May 9, 1793), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 700–702 (John Catanzariti, ed., 1992).
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son and Hamilton, but it permitted rapid and local response to neutral-
ity violations.  The administration adopted Randolph’s solution and the
United States District Attorneys became a key piece to the administra-
tion’s neutrality enforcement strategy.
As the administration discussed enforcement, French privateering
activities gave the administration its first case.  The Citizen Genet, one of
the vessels Genet outfitted in Charleston, seized the William, a British
merchant ship, near the mouth of the Chesapeake.219  In order to sell
the ship for condemnation as a prize, crew from the Citizen Genet had to
sail the William into port for a judicial determination on the seizure’s
legality.220  Gideon Henfield, a Revolutionary War privateer who had
been confined in a British prison, served as the prize master for the
William.221  Even before Henfield arrived in Philadelphia, the adminis-
tration heard about the seizure.  Following repeated cabinet conversa-
tions, Randolph and Jefferson sent instructions to the United States
District Attorneys.  Randolph sent letters to each of them informing
them of the proclamation and their role vis-a`-vis the Customs Collec-
tors.222  Jefferson instructed William Rawle to investigate and file
charges if warranted.223  Rawle found evidence convincing him that
charges were warranted, and Henfield was taken into custody.224  To
address these charges, the Circuit Court called a special session to meet
at the end of July.225
When the special session began, selecting and charging the grand
jurors was the first order of business.  Under the terms of the 1789 Judi-
ciary Act, jury selection occurred according to the same rules as the
state in which the federal court sat.226  In this case, Pennsylvania rules
governed, thus giving the U.S. Marshal wide latitude to find eligible
grand jurors as Pennsylvania court rules made sheriffs responsible for
locating jurors.227  Once selected, Supreme Court Justice James Wilson
delivered the charge.228  He began by telling them that the session had
219. CASTO, supra note 184, at 48–49; Letter to Thomas Jefferson from George
Hammond (Jun. 5, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 199–201 (John Cat-
anzariti, ed., 1995).
220. Id. at 43–45.
221. Id. at 100.
222. Letter to William Channing, in THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY DIGITAL COLLEC-
TIONS (1793) [hereinafter Channing].
223. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40–41 (John Catanzariti, ed., 1995).  Randolph sent a circu-
lar letter to the United States District Attorneys informing them about the need to prose-
cute neutrality cases. See Channing, supra note 222.
224. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (D. Pa., 1793); Letter to Thomas Jefferson
from Edmond Charles Genet (Jun. 1, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 159
(John Catanzariti, ed., 1995).
225. Minutes, United States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, Rough
Minutes, 1789-1794, RG21: United States District Courts—Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, National Archives Records—Philadelphia [hereinafter Circuit Court Minutes];
Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099.
226. Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, § 29.
227. Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries
in Virginia, 1789-1809, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 261–62 (2007).
228. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099.
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been called to deal with American citizens who had assisted the French.
Wilson then left the door open for other cases.  He explained that he
would instruct about neutrality and about criminal laws generally, sum-
marizing the nature of the common law.  Wilson turned to the relations
between states.  Here was the basis for criminal jurisdiction.  The fed-
eral government had an obligation to the warring nations.  He told
them:
To this universal society it is a duty that each nation should con-
tribute to the welfare, the perfection and the happiness of the
others.  If so, the first degree of this duty is to do no injury.
Among states as well as among men, justice is a sacred law.  This
sacred law prohibits one state from exciting disturbances in
another, from depriving it of its natural advantages, from calumni-
ating its reputation, from seducing its citizens, from debauching
the attachment of its allies, from fomenting or encouraging the
hatred of its enemies.229
Wilson continued, instructing the grand jurors that not only did
the government have an obligation externally but that the government,
in order to maintain peace, had to prevent its citizens from drawing the
nation as a whole into war.  He concluded his general legal instructions
with this: “That a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and without the
authority of the nation, takes an [sic] hostile part with either of the
belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty, and the laws of his coun-
try, is a position so plain as to require no proof, and to be scarcely
susceptible of a denial.”230
The grand jurors took Wilson’s charge to heart, particularly the
part that mentioned participating with either belligerent power.  In
addition to Henfield, the grand jury returned indictments and present-
ments against people believed to be aiding both the French and Brit-
ish.231  William Conolly, John Singletary, and two others named
Osborne and Jones were also indicted for serving on the Citizen
Genet.232  Louis Crousillat, a French merchant who, just the year before,
had taken an oath of allegiance to the United States, was also indicted
in connection with the Citizen Genet.233  He allegedly supplied war
materials for the vessel when it arrived in Philadelphia.  These indict-
ments indicate someone, whether the Customs Collector or William
Rawle, acquired significant evidence about the Citizen Genet’s activities
and the grand jury heard it.  In addition to the Citizen Genet, the grand
jurors heard evidence about another vessel seized by the French, the
Catherine.  This became another significant conflict both within Wash-
229. The Trial of Gideon Henfield for Enlisting in a French Privateer, in 4 AMERICAN
STATE TRIALS 615, 620 (John D. Lawson ed., 1915).
230. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099.
231. See Circuit Court Minutes, supra note 225.
232. Id.
233. Case Files, United States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, United
States v. Crousillat, 1789–1794, RG21: United States District Courts—Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, National Archives Records—Philadelphia.
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ington’s Administration and with French Minister Genet.234  One out-
come of that conflict was the indictment of Peter Barriere.235
According to the indictment, he supplied the newly renamed vessel, Le
Petite Democrat, with cannons.236  Barriere also served as the selling
agent for the William.237
Considering the Administration’s instructions and Rawle’s Federal-
ist orientation, these indictments are hardly surprising.  However, the
grand jury did not stop with those supporting the French.  William Mor-
gan, William Crammond, and James Campbell each faced charges for
supplying the British with war materials.238  There is some evidence
these cases may not have been as thoroughly investigated as the others.
Campbell’s offense date is listed as April 19.239  This was three days
prior to the Neutrality Proclamation.  Morgan, it turned out, was a Brit-
ish citizen.240  While neither flaw was necessarily fatal as both violated
the law of nations, they made the cases more complicated.241
The grand jury system gave people the ability to influence
prosecutorial decisions.  To convict anyone for violating federal law, the
government had to present its case to a grand jury.242  Citizens could
appear before the grand jury, deliver complaints to them, and initiate
criminal cases.243  Therefore, to properly enforce neutrality through
the courts, the government had to rely on the citizens who served on
these juries.
Only Henfield’s case went to trial during the special session.244
This raises the question of why.  Henfield’s case was the purpose for
calling the special session and both sides had time to prepare as
234. THOMAS, supra note 182, at 101–02; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard
Harison (June 12, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, May 11–August 31,
1793, 261–63 (John Catanzariti, ed., 1995).
235. Case Files, United States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, United
States v. Barriere, 1789–1794, RG 21: United States District Courts—Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, National Archives Records—Philadelphia.
236. Indictment, UNITED STATES V. BARRIERE, CASE FILES, MINUTES AND HABEAS
CORPUS AND CRIMINAL CASE FILES FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1789–1794 (Washington: National Archives, 1975).
237. Affidavit of Peter Barriere attached to Letter to Thomas Jefferson from
Edmond Charles Genet (Jun. 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281–83
(John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
238. See Circuit Court Minutes, supra note 225.
239. Id.
240. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from George Hammond (Jul. 11, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 469–70 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
241. At the time, Vattel was the pre-eminent authority on the Law of Nations (i.e.
international law).  During the debates on neutrality enforcement, Jefferson, Hamilton,
and Randolph, who were all lawyers, made repeated references to Vattel.  According to
Book II, Section 75 of Vattel, the offended state who has the individual who has commit-
ted the crime in custody, may seek redress.  In this instance, the British citizens who out-
fitted privateers were in the United States and therefore subject to punishment.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 2 THE LAW OF NATIONS § 75 (1760).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
243. Krent, supra note 19, at 293–95.
244. See Circuit Court Minutes, supra note 225.
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Henfield was arrested near the end of May.245  While the administra-
tion discussed one or two of the other cases, none received the atten-
tion and preparation that Henfield’s case received.  It is also possible
that the other cases did not go to trial because time was a factor.  The
Supreme Court Justices who presided over the circuit court meeting
had to ride circuit on a tight schedule.  It is possible that they had to
move on to the next town and did not have time to hear any other case.
However, one would think the other cases would come to trial at a sub-
sequent session.  Of the cases, only Barriere’s case appears in the subse-
quent circuit court minutes.246  When the circuit court reconvened in
April 1794, the United States dismissed the case.247  Of the remaining
cases, Morgan’s case received the most attention from the administra-
tion.  Jefferson and British Minister George Hammond discussed the
matter and Hammond conducted some independent investigation.248
Morgan captained the Jane, a British merchant ship.  Allegations sur-
faced that Morgan had taken on additional cannons while docked in
Philadelphia.249  Morgan, not surprisingly, denied this, claiming that
he was only shipping flour.250  The surviving court records do not indi-
cate what happened to this case.  Most likely, the government dropped
the case once it realized Morgan was a British citizen.  According to the
individual case files for the other cases, several appeared and asserted
innocence.251  As for the other cases, it is most likely that there were
presentments from the grand jury.  The grand jurors, acting on their
own accord, stated their belief that people had committed crimes.
Rawle, as the United States District Attorney, had a duty to draft com-
plaints but no duty to proceed further with the cases.252  Acting in con-
formity with administration instructions, Rawle only prosecuted
Henfield.
Henfield’s trial began a week after the grand jury began its ses-
sion.253  Like the grand jury, the names of the petit jurors were not
recorded in the court minutes.254  Evidence presentation and argu-
245. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from Edmond Charles Genet (Jun. 1, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160–61 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
246. See Circuit Court Minutes, supra note 225.
247. See id.
248. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from George Hammond (Jul. 11, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 469–70 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
249. Letter to George Washington from Thomas Mifflin (Jul. 5, 1793), in 13 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 178–79 (Christine Sternberg Patrick ed., 2007).
250. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from George Hammond (Jul. 11, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 469–70 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
251. See, e.g., UNITED STATES V. CAMPBELL AND UNITED STATES V. PEROT, CASE FILES,
MINUTES AND HABEAS CORPUS AND CRIMINAL CASE FILES FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1789–1794 (Washington: National Archives).
Interestingly, the cases in which this language appears all involve supplying the British.
When those aiding the French are presented in court, they were arraigned with an attor-
ney present.
252. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 41 (1794); Krent, supra note 19, at 294.
253. FED. GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1793, at 2.
254. See Circuit Court Minutes, supra note 225.  This omission is curious consider-
ing that the minutes list jurors in several other sessions, including a complete list of all of
those called for the Whiskey Rebellion cases the next summer.
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ment took two days.255  The jury deliberated over the course of three
days and returned a not guilty verdict.256  The trial itself proved une-
ventful, as most of the evidence had been presented six weeks prior in a
civil case where the William’s owners attempted to recover the vessel
through the civil courts.257  Henfield’s counsel did not dispute the facts
but argued no law prohibited Henfield’s actions.258  The three days of
deliberations demonstrated that the jury was not unanimous at the start
and had to debate the outcome.  Ultimately, however, they exonerated
Henfield.  The people had spoken definitively about the case.
3. Recalibrating Administration Policy
Yet, interpreting what the people said proved difficult.  The various
interpretations reflected the diverse opinions about the case.  Genet
lauded the acquittal, claiming the people had proclaimed that they
were not bound by Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and could aid
France as they wished.259  A story also circulated that Henfield, follow-
ing the celebrations, joined up with another privateer.260  Those from
the Federalist persuasion discounted the entire proceeding, claiming
that the jury was predisposed to acquit Henfield.261  Randolph per-
ceived the case as a victory for the Neutrality Proclamation.  He pointed
to Justice Wilson’s agreement that breaching the law of nations could
incur criminal liability.262  Randolph also spoke with the jury foreman
who reported that the jury doubted the proof presented in the case,
most likely due to the fact that Henfield could not have known about
the Neutrality Proclamation when he set sail from Charleston aboard
the Citizen Genet.263
Why did the government pursue this case?  Most likely, the govern-
ment used Henfield’s case to send a message to other nations and to
the American people.264  William Rawle, the United States District
Attorney, served as the government’s mouthpiece.  First, the prosecu-
tion mollified British Minister Hammond who vigorously protested
American participation aboard the French privateer.  Henfield’s prose-
cution demonstrated American neutrality to the British.  Second, the
prosecution sent a message to the American people that they should
not embark on privateering expeditions.  It appears that only two other
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57 (D. Pa. 1793); see also Affidavits of John
Whiteside and James Leggett, FINDLAY V. WILLIAM, CASE FILES, MINUTES AND HABEAS
CORPUS AND CRIMINAL CASE FILES FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1789–1794 (Washington: National Archives).
258. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
259. AMMON, supra note 183, at 71.
260. CASTO, supra note 184, at 100.
261. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1793), in 15
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 194–96 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
262. CASTO, supra note 184, at 99.
263. Letter to George Washington from Edmund Randolph (Aug. 21, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 524–25 (Christine Sternberg Patrick ed., 2007).
264. CASTO, supra note 184, at 93.
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Americans were prosecuted for participating in privateering activities.
Neither of those cases received attention from the administration.  No
discussion appears in the surviving correspondence of Washington, Jef-
ferson, Hamilton, or Randolph.
The outcome of Henfield’s trial, regardless of interpretation, did
not end the government’s neutrality enforcement efforts.  However, the
strategy changed.  In the fall, Jefferson sent a circular letter to all
United States District Attorneys.265  While the Customs Collectors con-
tinued to observe neutrality violations in the ports, Washington,
through Jefferson, instructed the District Attorneys to investigate any
seizures made by any privateers within three miles of the United States
coast.266  In one instance, Virginia’s United States District Attorney,
Alexander Campbell, investigated a prize taken by the privateer, Repub-
lic.267  After taking depositions from those involved, Campbell con-
cluded that the seizure occurred outside United States territorial
waters, thus making it immune from United States legal action.268
Throughout 1793, the administration’s neutrality enforcement pol-
icy evolved.  Beginning with debates about who would investigate and
charge, and ending with acquittals and re-direction.  From the outset,
the administration charted a course largely independent from popular
sentiment.  The United States District Attorneys, as lawyers for the gov-
ernment, represented the administration’s policy, even in the face of
acquittals and dismissals.  They faithfully received their instructions and
executed them when possible.  When it came time to choose a case for
prosecution, William Rawle selected a case involving an American serv-
ing for the French.  This selection sent a strong message, a message the
administration wanted to send, to the British, to Genet, and, especially,
to the American people.
V. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST
Despite the rhetoric of courts, commentators, and engravings on
buildings, United States Attorneys and their assistants represent the
interests of the United States government.  Those interests are not nec-
essarily to ensure that justice results.  Instead, as the government’s early
practice demonstrates, federal prosecutors implement and execute
national policy,269 even if individual injustice results, because national
interest requires it.  Focusing on policy enforcement constrains
prosecutorial decision-making and moves power away from the prosecu-
tor, leveling the power imbalance between members of the courtroom
workgroup.  By limiting prosecutors to the enforcement of national pol-
265. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the District Attorneys (Nov. 10, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 338–40 (John Catanzariti ed., 1997).
266. Id.
267. Letter from Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 4, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195–96 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
268. Id.
269. Leland E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of
Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 310, 314–17 (1978) (describing the difference
between policies, guidelines, and directives).
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icy, defense counsel, judges, and juries can reclaim the responsibilities
their roles require.
Today, we expect prosecutors to “do justice.”  This inherently
ambiguous term provides prosecutors with little practical guidance.
What is just in any particular circumstance?  Was it just to prosecute
Henfield for serving on the French privateer?  To some it certainly was.
Those who believed in a strong, centralized government and those who
favored the British believed justice was done.  They saw the acquittal as
unfortunate.  For others, however, it was the height of injustice.  Most
of Philadelphia’s inhabitants believed the prosecution unjust.  Henfield
was a hero.  His acquittal demonstrated the justness of their cause.  If
the public’s perception of justice was to be the basis for his decision,
how could Rawle decide?  No matter which action he took someone
would perceive it as unjust.
Justice is not solely people’s perceptions.  Justice entails accurately
determining what happened.270  Yet, Rawle did not do this in
Henfield’s case either.  In fact, what occurred was not in question.  Eve-
ryone agreed Henfield served as prize-master on the privateer.  Every-
one agreed he sailed the William into Philadelphia.  Everyone agreed
that Americans serving aboard French vessels violated American neu-
trality.  However, was this a violation of criminal law?  Was his act pun-
ishable as a crime?  Reasonable people—e.g. attorneys, Washington’s
cabinet, etc.—disagreed about whether Henfield’s conduct was crimi-
nal.  Apparently, it was not until after the trial that anyone considered
that Henfield was at sea when the neutrality proclamation was issued so
that it was incredibly unlikely that Henfield knew anything about the
neutrality proclamation until he arrived in Philadelphia.
Assuming justice prevailed, did justice prevail because Rawle
ensured Henfield received due process?271  Was the outcome just
because Henfield was indicted by a grand jury and subsequently acquit-
ted by a jury drawn from the area?  Was it just because he had a team of
talented attorneys representing him?  If this is so, would it be equally
just for Henfield to be convicted instead?  The process was the same.  As
this brief demonstration indicates, justice can be ambiguous and vague.
Rather than use justice as the standard for determining a prosecu-
tor’s actions, the notion that the prosecutor represents the national
interest as manifested through policy enforcement serves as a more
objective tool.  An administration can set policy in advance.  For
instance, following September 11, the Bush administration announced
that national security would be the government’s top priority.272  As a
result, national security prosecutions became the Justice Department’s
top priority.  During the 1980s, drug cases attracted the department’s
270. Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Light and Dark Sides of
‘Accuracy’ in Criminal Justice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 655, 655–57 (2005).
271. See generally, Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988).
272. Dan Balz, Bush Warns of Casualties of War, WASH. POST., Sep. 18, 2001, at A1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE202.txt unknown Seq: 39  7-SEP-17 12:26
2017] REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 331
attention due to President Reagan’s War on Drugs.273  Whether or not
prosecutors enforce policy provides an objective measure.  If prosecu-
tors ignore national security matters to deal with non-priority regulatory
matters, it might indicate that the prosecutor is not making wise deci-
sions.274  Perhaps the prosecutor is abusing his or her discretion or pur-
suing a personal agenda.  It also provides a measuring stick for efficient
resource utilization.  If an administration states national security is a top
priority, then it is reasonable to think most prosecutorial resources
should go in that direction.  If they do not, then it may indicate a
problem.
Beyond its use as a tool for commentators and the public, limiting
prosecutors to representing the nation’s policy goals has certain bene-
fits.  First, policy is public.  There are no secret agendas and the people
are on notice.  Second, policies change, thus connecting them to time
and situation.  Third, policy choices ultimately come from the people
and are responsive to the people’s wishes.  While it is not an immediate
reflection, if the policy choice steps too far beyond the public’s toler-
ance, the public will respond.275  Finally, it provides prosecutors with
clear guidance for discretionary decision-making.
Government policies are public.  In today’s information age, any-
one can search any government agency and determine its priorities.
The Justice Department, for example, publishes its 2014–18 strategic
plan on its website.276  Its top priority is to prevent terrorism.  Following
this broad goal, the policy lists several methods to effectuate the policy.
After disrupting potential attacks, the policy is to prosecute those
involved in terrorist acts, investigate and prosecute espionage activity,
and investigate and prosecute cyber-threat actors.  This is no different
from the Washington administration.  Washington’s neutrality procla-
mation in April 1793 announced the government’s intention to remain
neutral.  It also stated that those violating neutrality were subject to
prosecution.  In both instances, the people can respond to the policy in
a variety of ways.277
273. Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance: Presi-
dential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. OF POL. 995 (2003) (“present[ing] statistical tests
of the managerial power of presidential policy signals in the case of the United States
Attorneys’ implementation of the federal ‘War on Drugs’ . . . [P]residential policy signals
shifted the composition of the Attorneys’ caseload, although not to the exclusion of other
pertinent local, national, and internal factors.”).
274. Perry, supra note 25, at 142–46 (discussing typologies of United States Attor-
neys and their relationship to the Justice Department).
275. 2 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 19–21 (2d.
ed. 1995) (discussing how problems are defined).  The use of enhanced interrogation
techniques by the CIA post September 11, 2001 is an example of this.  Despite extensive
reviews by lawyers in the White House, the Justice Department, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, when the program was disclosed, the public outrage and subsequent politi-
cal fallout led to ending the program; see also JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN: THIRTY YEARS OF
CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA (2014).
276. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018: STRATEGIC PLAN, http://www.just
ice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/02/28/doj-fy-2014-2018-strategic-plan.pdf#
s4.
277. These include protests, petitions, and elections.
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As circumstances change, policy changes.  In 1793, the Washington
Administration had to avoid the war between France and Great Britain.
Enforcing neutrality policy became a key element of this effort.  The
European war did not last indefinitely as the French Revolution
descended into the Reign of Terror.278  Within five years, the adminis-
tration’s priorities turned to internal unrest.  Beginning with the Whis-
key Rebellion in western Pennsylvania and concluding with
enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the government adopted a
policy of crushing dissent.279  Those whom the government oppressed
formed an opposition and removed John Adams as President in favor of
Thomas Jefferson.280  With Jefferson’s inauguration, Alien and Sedition
Act enforcement ended.281  The September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States represent a similar change.  Prior to that day, terrorism
was not a significant government priority.282  However, following the
attacks, terrorism became the Department’s top priority.  Though it has
been fourteen years since that day and it remains the nation’s top prior-
ity, other concerns will eventually take precedence.  Even with the focus
on national security, other areas have become a priority from time to
time.  For example, during 2003–04, white collar crime became an
important government priority.283
Policy ultimately derives from the people.  While a government’s
policy may be criticized and unpopular, even amongst a majority of the
population, it still is “by the people” according to representative the-
ory.284  United States constitutional and republican theory permits the
people to express their will through elections.285  Once elected, repre-
sentatives act in the national interest, especially those of the Executive
Branch.  In fact, the President is the only elected official representing
the national interest.  In law enforcement matters, the President acts
through United States Attorneys who represent those interests.286  The
judicial system gives people a voice through service on grand and petit
juries, with the latter group passing final judgment on cases presented
to them.287
278. SCHAMA, supra note 148, at 783–85.
279. JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 53-59
(1951) (discussing the motives behind the Sedition Acts); see also FRITZ, supra note 82, at
169-70 (discussing Washington’s opposition to the protests).
280. MILLER, supra note 279, at 221–26.
281. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 303–05 (1956).
282. RIZZO, supra note 274, at 137–39 (discussing his perspective on the importance
of terrorism to the Clinton administration); see also GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT
MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR (2011) (discussing in Chapter 8,
the FBI’s work in the years preceding 9/11).
283. See generally, Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business
Scandals of 2002–03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the
Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 443 (2004).
284. See discussion supra Section III.A.
285. FRITZ, supra note 82, at 7.
286. Prakash, supra note 51.
287. NELSON, supra note 75, at 3–4.
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The problem for present federal criminal justice practice is that
jury trials are rare.  When they do not occur, the people lose their abil-
ity to judge the executive’s policy choices.  At the time of Henfield’s
prosecution there were few federal criminal cases.  His case went to trial
days after indictment.  Today, that cannot happen.  However, steps can
be taken to encourage more criminal trials.
Federal prosecutors spend considerable time investigating cases
and collecting evidence to establish strong cases that end with guilty
pleas.  Armed with a wide variety of vague criminal statutes, federal
prosecutors generally select easy cases to prosecute or those with the
most symbolic value.288  Coupled with the potential for long prison
sentences, federal defendants plead guilty at a high rate.289  Even in
cases where the evidence is not as strong, federal prosecutors persuade
defendants to enter guilty pleas in exchange for a reduced sentence or
to gain cooperation in other cases.290
The power to avoid trials derives from prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutors, especially federal prosecutors, have virtually unreviewable
discretion.291  With little public oversight and no judicial oversight,
prosecutors choose their cases with minimal guidance.  Commentators
have posed a variety of solutions to this problem.  Some have connected
prosecutorial discretion to ethical guidelines for attorneys generally.292
This has not worked as well as hoped because, without a human client,
there is no one to file an ethics complaint.  While defense attorneys and
judges could file an ethics complaint, the harm it could cause the court-
room workgroup’s functioning makes filing unlikely.293  Others have
argued for judicial control.  This has failed to gain traction as judges
use the separation of powers doctrine to justify not exerting control.294
Of course, this has not kept judges from writing highly critical opinions
288. Oesterle, supra note 283, at 449–51.
289. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014 Tables, UNITED STATES COURTS, http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014-tables (stat-
ing that according to the U.S Courts federal district court statistics for the 12-month
period between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, there were 89,403 criminal defendants
and that of those defendants, 82,084 were convicted and sentenced, 80,111 of which were
the result of guilty pleas).
290. Jeffery T. Ulmer, James Eisenstein & Brian D. Johnson, Trial Penalties in Federal
Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560 (2010).
291. Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669 (1992); Perry, supra note 25; Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an
Overcriminalized Justice System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569 (2010); Bruce A. Green & Fred
C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 187 (2008).
292. See generally Green, supra note 20.
293. Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007).
294. Robert Heller, Note, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law:
The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309
(1997); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (setting the standard for
judicial review of selective prosecution claims); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181
(1992) (setting the standard for judicial review of substantial assistance departures);
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (asserting that the Attorney General and
United States Attorneys maintain broad discretion to enforce the nation’s criminal laws).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE202.txt unknown Seq: 42  7-SEP-17 12:26
334 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
about prosecutorial conduct.295  Within the federal context, commen-
tators debate the amount of control the Justice Department should
have over prosecutorial decision-making.296  In the state system, com-
mentators have proposed tying budgets to the number of people incar-
cerated such that prosecutors pay for those they imprison.297  Others
have supported giving victims more power to initiate cases.298  Suffice
to say, none of these have empirically reduced prosecutorial miscon-
duct or perceptions of injustice.
The most common approach to controlling prosecutorial discre-
tion has been policy, specifically internal prosecutorial policy.299  This
approach also resulted in practical application as many prosecutor
offices created specialized units.300  These specialized units implement
charging policies to improve prosecutorial efficiency.  For example,
domestic violence units adopted victimless prosecution policies,
although with mixed results.301  The federal government also imple-
ments internal policies.  For instance, a United States Attorney’s Office
must have approval from the Justice Department prior to proceeding in
international terrorism matters.302
While policy has provided guidance to prosecutorial discretion, it
may be trumped by the obligation to do justice.  Blindly following pol-
icy can lead to injustice.303  Commentators and courts expect prosecu-
tors to be conscious of this.  Suppose prosecutors did not place justice
295. See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Stevens, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
296. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 523–30 (2011) (describing the federalism debate in criminal
law).
297. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 717 (1996).
298. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 357 (1986).
299. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2009)
(discussing the internal regulation of prosecutors); Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby &
Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary
Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52 (1981) (finding that policy
influences prosecutorial decision-making).
300. Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault
Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461
(2005); David C. Pyrooz, Scott E. Wolfe & Cassia Spohn, Gang-Related Homicide Charging
Decisions: The Implementation of a Specialized Prosecution Unit in Los Angeles, 22 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 3 (2011).
301. Andrea J. Nichols, No-Drop Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Survivor-Defined
and Social Change Approaches to Victim Advocacy, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2114 (2014)
(describing non-drop policies of domestic violence units and discussing the differing per-
spectives on no-drop policies); see also John L. Worrall, Jay W. Ross & Eric S. McCord,
Modeling Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 472
(2006).
302. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.136.
303. See Beale, supra note 96 (stating that the firings of several United States Attor-
neys in 2006 provide a good example and were allegedly fired because they refused to
prosecute specific public corruption cases targeting Democrats, specifically, policy dic-
tated that they prosecute but, in their minds, justice required otherwise).
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above policy adherence.  What would this look like, particularly in the
context of federal prosecutions?
Without the obligation to do justice, federal prosecutors would
focus the bulk of their resources on categories of crimes relevant not
only nationally but also locally.  Today’s prosecutors, whether federal or
state, work closely with their respective communities.304  One key
aspect of community work involves identifying the community’s con-
cerns.  Once identified, prosecutors address these community
problems.  This translates into a focus on crime categories.  Some com-
munities might have a burglary problem.  Prosecutors would respond
by increasing burglary prosecutions.  On the federal level, there might
be a public housing problem.  Federal prosecutors could investigate
criminal violations relating to housing management.  Similarly, investi-
gatory agencies might attempt to address problems.  For example, the
Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service might focus
upon illegal ginseng transactions.305  No matter the focus, however,
prosecutors must select their cases with set financial and personnel
resources.  The various United States Attorney offices only have so
much money to spend on prosecutorial salaries.
Without the burden of guaranteeing accuracy, prosecutors will
focus more attention on policy enforcement by taking on borderline
cases in priority areas.306  While some might argue prosecutors should
not take on such cases, these cases will most likely go to trial.  When
cases go to trial, the public can voice its opinion about the policy
choice.  The good cases will still be pleaded; the bad cases will not be
filed.  As prosecutors scrutinize public response, marginal cases con-
strain and guide prosecutorial decision-making.
The key to marginal cases is reviewing outcomes.  Following
Henfield’s acquittal, the Washington administration altered its policy by
shifting attention from enforcing neutrality against Americans to
preventing the arming of privateers in sea ports.  Christopher Gore,
Massachusetts United States District Attorney, spent considerable effort
attempting to convict the French consul in Boston of arming privateers
without success.307  The Philadelphia grand jury indictments focused
on arming privateers and the one case followed up on by the govern-
304. Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A
Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 239 (2005); see also Anthony
V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002); Melanie D. Wilson, Anti-
Justice, 81 TENN. L. REV. 699 (2014).
305. See, e.g., Press Release, USAO, W.D.N.C., Ginseng Root Poacher Sentenced to
Jail Time (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/pr/ginseng-root-poacher-
sentenced-jail-time.
306. For a study on how prosecutors handle marginal cases, see Sanford C. Gordon
& Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46
AM. J. POL. SCI. 334 (2002).
307. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Christopher Gore (September 2, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Sept. 1–Dec. 31, 1793, 13–14 (John Catanzariti ed.,
1997); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, Cabinet Opinions on
the Roland and Relations with Great Britain, France, and the Creeks (August 31, 1793), in
26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, May 11–Aug. 31, 1793, 795–98 (John Catanzariti
ed., 1995).
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ment was for arming French privateers.308  The French were not the
only government target however.  Virginia’s United States District Attor-
ney Alexander Campbell investigated a British seizure, ultimately find-
ing that it took place outside United States jurisdiction.309
The policy change likely resulted from one of two reasons, both
supporting the idea that prosecutors should prosecute marginal cases
and review the outcomes.  First, it is possible that there were no more
Americans engaging in privateering activities.  Word of America’s neu-
trality spread slowly, but with the notoriety achieved by Henfield’s case,
the administration sent a strong message to its citizens that serious con-
sequences would ensue if they participated beyond supplying goods.310
Second, the verdict may have caused the administration to shy away
from these cases.  In addition to Henfield’s acquittal, two similar crimi-
nal cases occurred at the same time.  One prosecution in North Caro-
lina was discontinued.311  The other, in Georgia, resulted in an
acquittal.312  The public spoke clearly that they would not convict in
these cases.
Reviewing outcomes is essential for the public to communicate its
opinion on specific policy choices.  Suppose the government begins
prosecuting unlawful transactions in ginseng but, due to the nature of
the cases, has difficulty procuring strong evidence.  Despite the weak
cases, the government decides to proceed with several cases to send a
message.  It might find that the jury acquits.  Federal prosecutors
should then realize the American people prefer to have resources
devoted to other crime areas.  At the same time, the administration still
sends a message to the people that ginseng is an important natural
resource requiring protection.
Presidential administrations that do not heed the people’s voice in
criminal law enforcement may find themselves replaced.  Though heav-
ily criticized, Washington’s Vice President succeeded Washington as
President.  Washington carefully made his policy choices.  The Adams
administration, however, did not heed the public’s voice but suppressed
it through vigorous sedition prosecutions.  Confronted with mounting
criticism from the Republican faction, Adams and Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering went to great lengths to prosecute offenders.313
They went so far as to use liberal jury selection methods to create juries
308. Letter from Christopher Gore to Thomas Jefferson (October 21, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Sept. 1–Dec. 31, 1793, 261 (John Catanzariti ed.,
1997).
309. Letter from Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson (October 4, 1793), in 27 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Sept. 1–Dec. 31, 1793, 195–96 (John Catanzariti ed., 1997).
310. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, May 11–Aug. 31, 1793, 42–44 (John Catanzariti ed.,
1995).  This correspondence, and a similar one to British Minister Hammond, became
the official statement of how the Washington administration viewed its neutrality respon-
sibilities. See supra note 1.
311. CASTO, supra note 184, at 100.
312. Id. at 100–01.
313. SMITH, supra note 281, at 182–87.
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prepared to convict.  The failure to heed the public’s voice aided
Thomas Jefferson’s election.
One potential objection to disconnecting criminal prosecutors
from the obligation to pursue justice is the potential for wrongful con-
victions.  One could argue that the ethical responsibility to do justice
prevents prosecutors from indiscriminate use of their power.  However,
even with the obligation in place, there is widespread misconduct and
hundreds of wrongful convictions.314  It is not likely to get worse by
disconnecting prosecutors and justice.  The effect the disconnection
will have is that it will place more pressure on judges and defense attor-
neys.  They must thoroughly scrutinize cases, especially marginal ones.
Currently, there is little incentive to thoroughly scrutinize prosecutorial
actions because defense attorneys and judges rely upon the prosecu-
tors’ duty to do justice, which is interpreted as being accurate.315  In
terms of accuracy, few if any prosecutors want to falsely convict some-
one, even without the ethical duty to do justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today’s prosecutors have tremendous power through their daily
discretionary decisions.  Sometimes they abuse this power.  After exam-
ining numerous causes for such abuse, suggestions have been made to
reduce discretion.  Even with implementing some proposals, prosecu-
tors, and federal prosecutors in particular, still utilize broad statutory
crimes coupled with broad discretion.  How can such discretion be
constrained?
This Article draws upon the origins of federal criminal prosecution
to argue that federal prosecutors represent the government’s policy
position, even if the public objects.  The Washington administration
faced significant public criticism for its neutrality policy.  Despite this, it
recognized the policy’s national importance.  Had it failed to vigorously
enforce neutrality, European nations may not have believed the United
States was neutral and the United States could have been drawn into
war.  While many perceived the administration’s actions as unjust, the
government persisted, taking one case to trial.  While the facts were not
contested, Henfield’s guilt was debated.  Ultimately, as a republic, the
people’s voice prevailed.  They spoke through juries.
Today, especially in the federal system, the people rarely have an
opportunity to speak.  Even when cases go to trial, they are cases where
the defendant has nothing to lose by going to trial.  Marginal cases are
disfavored.  This needs to be reversed.  Prosecutors need to take more
marginal cases into court so the public can speak.  By detaching prose-
cutors from the obligation to do justice and giving clear policy gui-
dance, prosecutors will devote their resources to a specific category of
cases and present marginal cases.  Juries will hear these cases and use
314. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions:
A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2009).
315. Green, supra note 20, at 637–42 (examining prosecutorial responsibility to
find the truth in a wrongful conviction case).
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their collective voice to pass judgment on the policy.  By reviewing out-
comes, governments and prosecutors can adjust their policy
appropriately.
Ultimately, prosecutors represent the government that hired them,
just like any other attorney.  When the client gives direction to the
attorney, the attorney counsels the client on the outcome or conse-
quences but ultimately follows directions within ethical bounds.  Prose-
cutors should act the same way.  The people selected the government
policymakers.  Prosecutors should follow government law enforcement
policies, even if potential injustice results.  In this way, prosecutors ulti-
mately represent all of the people.
